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Zoning variances are notoriously badly administered. Granted by
locally appointed independent administrative boards called zoning
boards of adjustment or sometimes zoning boards of appeals, commonly
referred to as "ZBAs,"' variances were originally intended to be
available only under a very narrow set of circumstances-where an
owner was unable to make any economically valuable use of his
property under the current zoning restrictions because of some peculiar
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1. The Wisconsin zoning enabling statute for counties, WIS. STAT. § 59.694 (2005-2006),
refers to ZBAs for counties as zoning "board[s] of adjustment." The parallel provision in the
enabling statute for cities and villages refers to them as zoning "board[s] of appeals." Id. §
62.23(7)(e). The disparity in terms is the result of the different origins of these two distinct
state statutes.
Most state zoning enabling laws in this country are patterned after the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, first circulated in draft form by the United States Department of
Commerce in 1922 and then formally proposed in 1926. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT 3 (1926) (Explanatory Notes in General). The
Standard Act refers to these bodies as zoning "board[s] of adjustment." Id. § 7. Wisconsin's
first zoning enabling act for counties was adopted in 1923. Act of July 12, 1923, ch. 388, 1923
Wis. Sess. Laws 666. It did not include a provision for a zoning board of adjustment. The
statute was amended in 1927 and followed the Standard Act very closely, including the
provision for the creation of a zoning "board of adjustment." Act of July 18, 1927, ch. 408,
1927 Wis. Sess. Laws 502. The county enabling statute has been modified many times since
1927 but still includes the original language from 1927 that permitted the creation of boards of
adjustment.
Until 1941, the enabling statute for cities limited the function of zoning boards of appeals
to hearing appeals from decisions of zoning administrators. The early provision did not
include the power to grant variances or special exceptions as did the Standard Act and the
Wisconsin enabling statute for counties. Act of July 14, 1921, ch. 590, §§ 104-107, 1921 Wis.
Sess. Laws 1118, 1137-38. Consequently, the boards were called zoning "board[s] of
appeals." Id. When the statute was amended in 1941 to include the full range of powers
ordinarily conferred on these boards, the original name was nonetheless retained. Act of
June 3, 1941, ch. 203, 1941 Wis. Sess. Laws 252.
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condition of the property not shared by any other parcels in his
contiguous zone, and where the variance, were it granted, would not
frustrate the policies reflected in the legislative body's choice of the
particular zone for the particular area.2 If Homer's property, for
instance, alone among the other properties in his neighborhood of
similarly zoned parcels, was home to a wetland that left inadequate
room for development within the prescribed setbacks, Homer might be
entitled to a variance from the setback requirements provided that the
variance did not interfere with the goals of the zone.
On the other hand, if granting the variance compromised the local
legislative body's plan for the area embodied in the zone, or if a number
of parcels within the zone were affected in the same way by wetlands,
then any remedy for the inability of the owner to develop the property
belonged to the legislature. The legislative body could then make a
more comprehensive policy decision about the appropriateness of the
zone or some other remedy for Homer. The strategy reflects the
traditional and sound understanding of the appropriate and distinctive
roles of appointed local administrative boards and locally elected
legislative, policy-making bodies.
But this is not how local ZBAs typically operate. More commonly,
as reflected in a recent survey of actual variance practices in Wisconsin
by Mr. Wald Klimczyk, ZBAs disregard the requirement that the
property suffer some unique physical disparity within the neighborhood,
regard the hardship requirement as simply relative to the desire of the
owner, and grant variances when, in the opinion of the board, the
requested variance would not seriously compromise the character of the
neighborhood.' The liberality of ZBAs is reflected in the very large
number of variances they regularly grant relative to the extraordinary
nature of the remedy. The Klimczyk survey of variance decisions in a
sample of cities, villages, and towns in Wisconsin during the roughly
two-year period beginning May 28, 1998, showed that ten of the forty-
seven responding municipalities, or roughly 21%, granted 100% of the
applications submitted for variances.! Roughly 25% of municipalities
granted between 80% and 99% of the applications received; 30%
granted between 60% and 79% of applications; and only 23% of
2. See infra Part II for a thorough examination of the provisions of the Wisconsin zoning
enabling act that permits variances and defines the conditions for their approval.
3. Wald Klimczyk, Variances of Zoning Code Requirements: Current Practices by
Wisconsin Cities, Towns & Villages (June 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (prepared for presentation to the League of Wisconsin Municipalities Institute).
4. Id. at Attachment A.
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municipalities granted fewer than 60% of applications (up from only
one municipality in the preceding two-and-one-half-year period).'
The absolute numbers of variances compared to the number of
households within the municipalities is also surprisingly large. For
example, during the roughly four-year period from January 1996
through March 2000, Sheboygan, a relatively small city of only fourteen
square miles and 20,779 households,6 granted 256 variances out of 292
applications submitted Green Bay, with forty-four square miles and
41,591 households,8 granted 605 variances out of 716 applications
submitted.9 It strains credulity that the owners of 605 parcels of land in
Green Bay in just a single four-year period discovered that their parcels
suffered unique physical features that, under the prevailing zoning
restrictions, prevented those owners from using their land in any
economically beneficial way. The survey does not report the nature of
the variances sought, whether for dimensions or uses, or any of the facts
for these cases, though it does suggest that the vast majority are for
dimension variances.0 If the reported Wisconsin Supreme Court
decisions are any indication, however, as we will see, it is likely that
most of these variances were sought to expand uses that were already
well-established, undermining any claim that the parcels could not be
put to some economically beneficial use.
Even more revealing than the numbers is the summary of Wisconsin
variance law by the survey's author, a municipal lawyer in Wisconsin. In
his own description of Wisconsin variance law, he omitted, without
comment, the defining requirement of the variance, that the property be
burdened by a unique condition." Summarizing the proceedings of
5. Id.
6. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Sheboygan (city), Wisconsin,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5572975.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
Information about populations and households is drawn from the most recent U.S. Census
completed in 2000 and reported at http://www.census.gov/.
7. Klimczyk, supra note 3, at Attachment A.
8. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Green Bay (city), Wisconsin,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5531000.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
9. Klimczyk, supra note 3, at Attachment A.
10. Id. at 12 ("Area variances are by far the most common form of variance requested
and granted.").
11. Though the author quotes in its entirety the provision of the enabling statute for
cities, villages, and towns concerning variances, his own summary of the law says only the
following:
Four findings by a ZBA upon which variances can be granted are
mandated by statute: (1) The finding of an unnecessary hardship resulting
2007]
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ZBAs submitted for the survey and comments by other municipal
attorneys, Klimczyk also reports that "[m]ost ZBA's find only
'necessity' or 'hardship' and then grant the variance,' 2 "[m]ost ZBA's
base area variance grants on fairness and appropriateness rationale,' 3
and "[m]ost ZBA's simply make a finding that granting the variance is
in the best interest of the community and of necessity to the property
owner/applicant.' ' 4 Indeed, the survey recounts what it refers to as
"Wald's Statewide Rule of Four," which it claims "permeates all
Wisconsin cities[,] towns[,] and villages":
If four or more persons appear at the ZBA variance
hearing in person or in writing objecting to the
application, then the variance is always denied. The
objectors don't have to be neighbors. They can live
across town. There were only one or two exceptions to
15this rule in 85 communities over four years ....
On the other hand, having fewer than four people appear at the
hearing and object to the variance does not guarantee that the variance
will be granted. As the survey concludes, "If three or fewer objectors
appear at a ZBA variance application hearing, there is no rhyme or




What is perhaps most fascinating about the widespread rogue
practices of ZBAs is that they have persisted despite the fact that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, at least until recently, when called upon to
review decisions by ZBAs, has consistently followed the traditional,
very restrictive understanding of variance law. 7 The disparity between
firm judicial decisions and the practices of ZBAs may be explained in
part by the lack of challenges to variance decisions by ZBAs, which is
from the literal enforcement of the ordinance; (2) A variance is required
so that the spirit of the zoning code can be observed; (3) Substantial
justice would be served by granting the variance; and (4) Granting of the
variance would not be contrary to the public interests.
Id. at8.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d




likely explained in part by "Wald's Statewide Rule of Four" described
above. It is worth observing that all of the supreme court decisions
discussed in this essay involved challenges by the state's Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) to decisions by county ZBAs involving
variances from shoreland setbacks required under state law. None were
challenged by neighbors.
One is tempted to conclude that if no one challenges the variance
decisions of ZBAs, then perhaps there is nothing amiss in the liberality
of ZBAs permitting property owners to do as they propose. Property
owners are being permitted to develop their property as they wish and
apparently no one feels harmed. Under those circumstances, to insist
that an owner abide by the limitations of the zoning ordinance borders
on arbitrariness. 8 Moreover, so long as the courts are available to
correct those decisions by ZBAs that someone does care enough to
challenge, including challenges by the DNR involving established state-
wide policies originating with the state legislature, perhaps the balance
of public and private interests is not being too ill-served.
Two recent decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however,
seriously undermine even this minimum protection of neighboring uses
and statewide policies and appear to throw the court's weight solidly
behind the widespread rogue practices of ZBAs. State ex rel. Ziervogel
v. Washington County Board of Adjustment,9 decided in March of 2004,
and State v. Waushara County Board of Adjustment,2" decided just two
months later in May of 2004, addressed the same issue-the proper
interpretation of the terms "unnecessary hardship" in the variance
provision of the zoning enabling legislation for counties,' in particular
as applied in the context of applications for dimension variances.22 Both
decisions came to roughly the same conclusion, that "unnecessary
hardship" means something different and less demanding for dimension
variances than for use variances.23 In itself, the decision to lower the
standard for dimension variances is significant; it moved the test of
18. Even this conclusion may be deceptive. After all, it demands no small investment to
pursue a lawsuit challenging any governmental decision. Without a careful empirical survey
of the attitudes of neighbors and their reasons for not objecting, it is difficult to draw any
reliable conclusions about how well neighbors receive the decisions of ZBAs.
19. 2004 WI 23, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.
20. 2004 WI 56, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.
21. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) (1999-2000).
22. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 2, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 2, 679 N.W.2d 514, 2;
Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 1 2-3, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 2-3, 676 N.W.2d 401, 1$ 2-3.
23. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 2, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 2, 679 N.W.2d 514, J 2;
Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 4-5,269 Wis. 2d 549, 4-5,676 N.W.2d 401, J% 4-5.
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hardship from an objective standard of no economic use to a standard
that is relative to the owner's desires. The test then becomes something
of a balance between the owner's desires and the impact of those
desires, in the opinion of the ZBA, on the surrounding neighborhood.
As Justice Sykes declared for the majority in Ziervogel, one of the
several essential purposes served by variance procedure in zoning law is
"to provide a procedure by which the public interest in zoning
compliance can be balanced against the private interests of property
owners in individual cases."24 Both decisions arrive at that conclusion by
insisting that the enabling statutes were intended to delegate to the
ZBAs substantial discretion in granting variances and that the more
demanding notion of hardship would constrict that discretion to almost
zero.2
But the decisions may well stand for much more. Even if the
standard of hardship is liberalized for dimension variances, variances
would remain an extraordinary remedy so long as the uniqueness
requirement is honored, that is, so long as variances are seen as a
remedy that is limited to properties that are in some way physically
different from the other properties, and it is the difference that prevents
the owner from developing the property to the extent the owner desires.
Even though the court referred to the uniqueness requirement in both
26decisions, there are many reasons to believe, as we will see in Part IV,
that the uniqueness requirement is no longer a significant aspect of the
test for a variance. If that is the case, then the variance has been
transformed from an extraordinary remedy for a very limited problem
to an opportunity for any landowner in just about any situation to have
a local board give the landowner permission to stretch the bounds of
zoning law as defined by the municipality's legislature. Thus, the court
will have thrown its weight behind the rogue practices of ZBAs and at
the same time will have virtually eliminated any corrective role for the
courts. After all, if the decision comes down to the ZBA weighing the
loss to the owner against the loss to the community, what is there for a
court to do that does not essentially duplicate the discretion supposedly
left by the legislature to the agency?
The reasoning in each opinion is somewhat different, and the
24. Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 17, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 17, 676 N.W.2d 401, 17.
25. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 2, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 2, 679 N.W.2d 514, 2;
Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 2, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 1 2, 676 N.W.2d 401, T 2.
26. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 6 n.8, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 91 6 n.8, 679 N.W.2d 514, 91 6
n.8; Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 7, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 7, 676 N.W.2d 401, f 7.
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standards they prescribe may also differ slightly. Both decisions,
however, begin with the ipse dixit, not derived from any analysis of the
text of the statute, that the state enabling statute intended to grant
ZBAs substantial discretion. 7 Both decisions thus share in the failure to
ground the change in law in any analysis of or insight into the text of the
variance provision of the county enabling statute. The court in both
opinions similarly fails to engage in any adequate analysis of the court's
own prior decisions in this area. The authors of the opinions, Justice
Sykes in Ziervogel and Justice Crooks in Waushara County, claim to be
returning to a root precedent from 1976, Snyder v. Waukesha County
Zoning Board of Adjustment.2 8 Ziervogel, the first and perhaps the more
radical of the two opinions, claimed, without analysis, that Snyder
established distinct definitions of "hardship" for dimensions and use
variances." That distinction was abandoned, however, according to the
court, in one of its more recent decisions in 1998, State v. Kenosha
County Board of Adjustment.3" That accusation is far from accurate, and
one is left ultimately with the strong impression that both decisions are
driven by ideological commitments rather than methodological rigor or
any objective insight into the statute that the court was interpreting.
The decisions are not only bad zoning law, badly interpreting the state
enabling statute for counties, they also seriously distort the intended and
legitimate role of zoning boards of appeals and the legislative bodies of
counties, not to mention the court's own role in interpreting statutory
law and monitoring agencies.
My purpose in this article is to revisit the variance provision of the
state zoning enabling statute for counties in light of its place in the
larger statutory scheme and in light of Wisconsin case law up to the
decisions in Ziervogel and Waushara County. Part II examines the
variance provision in its larger statutory context. Part III considers the
case law leading up to Ziervogel and Waushara County. Part IV dissects
the various problems with the decisions in those two cases. Part V takes
up an issue that was present in both Ziervogel and Waushara County but
not thoroughly addressed: the availability of variances from the
statutory restrictions on pre-existing, nonconforming uses. Part VI
addresses the parallel variance provision in the enabling statute for
27. Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 2, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 2, 676 N.W.2d 401, 2; Waushara
County, 2004 WI 56, 2, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 2, 679 N.W.2d 514, 2.
28. 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976).
29. Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, 3, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 1 3, 676 N.W.2d 401, $ 3.
30. 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).
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cities.3 ' The variance provision for cities differs from the provision for
counties precisely by including two different terms for the degree of
hardship that would permit a variance.
II. VARIANCE LAW IN ITS STATUTORY CONTEXT
The power of municipal governments to adopt zoning ordinances is
either a dimension of their home rule powers, granted by article XI,
section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, or delegated to them by the
state legislature pursuant to specific enabling legislation. Regardless of
the source of the power, the enabling legislation also elaborately
regulates the way in which municipal governments exercise the power to
zone.3 ' The Wisconsin enabling statute for counties, like the distinct
statute for cities and villages, is closely patterned after the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act first published in draft form by the U.S.
Department of Commerce in 1922 and then in its final version in 1926.
The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, even in its draft form, quickly
became the model for virtually all zoning enabling legislation across the
country.33
Among other things, the state enabling statute for counties permits
counties to create local zoning boards of adjustment with well-defined
powers, including the power to grant variances.34 The extraordinary
nature of variances and the limited scope of the discretion of ZBAs to
grant variances are evident in the first instance from the very narrow
language of the provision in the enabling statute that provides for the
possibility of variances. That conclusion is doubly and triply reinforced,
first, by the nature of the other powers of the ZBA and then by the role
anticipated by the statute for the legislative body.
The variance provision for counties is codified at section 59.694(7)(c)
of the Wisconsin Statutes. That provision reads in its entirety:
(7) Powers of board. The board of adjustment shall have
all of the following powers:
31. WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e)7 (2005-2006).
32. This is so in Wisconsin because the Wisconsin Constitution gives to the legislature
the power to regulate the exercise of home rule powers for the sake of uniformity. Wisconsin
Constitution article XI, section 3(1) reads: "Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law
may determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or
every village."
33. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.15 (5th ed. 2003).
34. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) (2005-2006).
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(c) To authorize upon appeal in specific cases
variances from the terms of the ordinance that will not be
contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special
conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that
the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
substantial justice done.35
This provision, drawn directly from the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act," is somewhat prolix. The adjective "unnecessary" that
appears to condition the hardship requirement is repetitive of the
condition that the variance not be contrary to the public interest. The
necessity of the hardship is relative to the public interest in the strict
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance. The entire last clause of
the provision, "that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
substantial justice done," adds nothing to the conditions for the grant of
the variance and seems to be merely an explanation for the inclusion of
the variance-to do justice in the circumstances described, when
possible, without compromising the goals of the zoning restrictions for
the larger area in which the parcel is located. 7
Stripped of its redundancies, the provision permits variances when
the following three conditions are present:
i. The property possesses features not shared by other
properties in its contiguous zone ("special
conditions").
ii. Because of the special conditions, it is hard for the
owner to develop the property consistent with the
restrictions of its zone.
iii. Granting the variance would not be contrary to the
public interest as reflected in the restrictions for the
35. Id.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7
(1926).
37. This is not the only prolixity in the Standard Act and the Wisconsin statute. Both
provide for the possibilities of special exceptions in two different places. Compare WiS.
STAT. § 59.694(1) ("[T]he board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and subject to
appropriate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance
.... ") with WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(b) (The board of adjustment has the power "[t]o hear and
decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which the board is required to




The Standard Act provides substantial general comments and more
detailed comments on many of its provisions.39  It provides no
comments, however, on the variance provision. Nonetheless, courts
around the country have converged on a common understanding of
these three conditions, a common understanding that was shared by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, as we will see in the next section.4°
The first two requirements are the defining conditions of the
variance. The remedy is available to relieve the hardship that occurs
when one parcel of land within its contiguous zone is different from the
other parcels and the difference prevents the property from being
developed within the restrictions of the zone. Differences that make it
hard to develop land can be geological, hydrological, or topographical.
Less likely, the difference can be the result of being on the margins of
the zone and bordered by other uses that make the permitted uses under
the zone inappropriate for the parcel. Individual parcels can be
uniquely affected because zones tend to be fairly large, from a few acres
up to a number of square miles in area. Within a contiguous zone,
therefore, one parcel may have slopes, water, or exposed escarpment
that might make it difficult or impossible to erect any useful structures
and stay within the setbacks. A particular parcel may also be too small
to permit development within the dimension requirements. That can
happen when the parcel was subdivided before the zoning ordinance
was adopted, with its minimum lot size requirements, and the parcel is
much smaller than all of the other parcels in the zone that were assumed
to characterize the area.
38. See WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c). One of the early decisions interpreting this language,
regarded as a classic decision by the treatise writers, is Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y.
1939). In that decision, the New York Court of Appeals summarized the three requirements:
Before the Board may . . . grant a variance upon the ground of
unnecessary hardship, the record must show that (1) the land in question
cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that
zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and
not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may reflect the
unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to be
authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the
locality.
Id. at 853.
39. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
ACT (1926).
40. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 6.44.
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From the very beginning, the threshold for a remediable hardship
has been the same as the extreme limit for a regulatory taking: no
economically beneficial use. Though the Standard Act offers no
comment defining "hardship," it has to be born in mind that the final
version of the Standard Act was published only four years after the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," the
Court's landmark decision in which it held for the first time that a land
use regulation could amount to a taking governed by the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.42 Pennsylvania Coal
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which prohibited
coal companies from mining coal in any way that would cause a
subsidence of the surface.43 The Court held that the Act amounted to a
taking because it "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property and
contract.",41 It found that "[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable
is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.""
While clearly addressed to the regulatory takings problem, the
41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Id. at 415. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.").
43. 260 U.S. at 412-13.
44. Id. at 413.
45. Id. at 414. In the years following Pennsylvania Coal, the Court gave the doctrine of
regulatory takings only the most amorphous shape, much as it did with a number of other
doctrines during that period. It refused to articulate bright-line rules and instead judged
every case ad hoc and largely intuitively based upon the weight it assigned to a number of
factors favoring both the property owner and the community. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, which is in many respects the
last gasp of the intuitive approach, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained,
"[Tihis Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons." Id. at 124. Soon after its decision in Penn Central, the Court introduced two
per se taking rules. The first applied to regulations that required an owner to tolerate a
permanent physical invasion of his or her property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The second applied to regulations that so restricted the
use of property that the regulation destroyed the entire economic value of the property.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Footnote eight in Lucas kept alive the
Penn Central approach for regulations that diminished the value of property without
destroying the entire economic value. Id. at 1019 n.8. However, Justice Scalia's opinion for
the majority made it clear that the old ad hoc balancing test was no longer a balancing test.
Id. at 1031. The public's interest in the regulation was corralled into a nuisance exception: a
regulation that diminished the value of property to the threshold for a taking was nonetheless
not a taking if it did no more than duplicate the result of applying the traditional rules for
private or public nuisances. Id. at 1029.
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variance provision is not intended to be a complete remedy nor the sole
remedy. Implicit in the conditions for the variance is the possibility that
even if the restrictions for the zone destroy the entire economic value of
the parcel, the owner still might not be entitled to a variance. That can
happen if there are other properties that share the same physical
features that create the hardship or if the ZBA determines that granting
the variance would compromise the legislature's policy goals for the
wider area reflected in the legislature's choice of zone. In either event,
the more appropriate remedy is before the municipal legislative body. If
there are more than a small number of parcels sharing the same
disabling physical feature, that circumstance would suggest a problem
with the choice of the particular zone for that area, a problem that
would be more comprehensively and more appropriately addressed,
consistent with the principles of separation of powers, by the
municipality's legislative branch. One of the hallmarks of zoning is
comprehensive planning. Indeed, one of the conditions for any zoning
ordinance is that it be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan.,
46
ZBAs are not in the position to craft comprehensive solutions to wider
problems. They have jurisdiction over only the parcel immediately
before them, and, as quasi-judicial bodies, they are appropriately denied
the policy-making authority exercised by legislative bodies.
The unique importance of the legislative bodies is further
underscored by the procedures and expertise available to legislative
bodies that are denied to mere ZBAs. The remedy for multiple
homeowners or for a homeowner whose desired use would conflict with
the neighborhood would involve an amendment to the zoning
ordinance. Before a municipal legislature can amend its ordinance, the
application for the amendment first must be studied by the
municipality's planning commission or zoning agency, which will then
submit its study and recommendation to the legislature.47 Planning
commissions and zoning agencies, unlike ZBAs, tend to be composed of
professional planners, architects, and engineers, or have such
professionals on their staffs. The involvement of planning commissions
and zoning agencies with professional staffs promotes informed
deliberations about matters requiring the creation or fine tuning of
policy.
Thus, the uniqueness requirement and the requirement that the
46. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3
(1926); WIs. STAT. §§ 59.69(3), 62.23(7)(c) (2005-2006).
47. See WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69(5), 62.23(1), 62.23(7)(d)(2).
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variance not compromise the public policy reflected in the zone serve to
limit the remedy to circumstances that can appropriately be addressed
by an independent agency staffed by unelected, often amateur citizen
volunteers. This function of the zoning conditions, to sort out problems
appropriate for limited quasi-judicial judgments from those best left to
the policy-making branch, clearly indicates a very limited role and
limited determination by the ZBAs.
Indeed, to even speak of the ZBAs having "discretion" would
appear to overstate their responsibilities. ZBAs under the provision are
required to make findings, and if they find that the three conditions are
satisfied, then, and only then, may they grant a variance."' If the
conditions are satisfied, owners are entitled to the variance. If the
conditions are not satisfied, the appropriate remedy is with the
legislative body. There is little room in this scheme for the ZBAs to
exercise discretion. The discretion belongs to the legislative body.
The tightly circumscribed character of the determination to be made
by ZBAs with regard to variances is underscored by viewing it within
the context of the two other equally limited powers of the ZBA. The
first duty given to ZBAs is to grant special exceptions to the terms of the
ordinance. The provision providing for that power twice in the same
sentence iterates that the power is to be exercised subject to guidance
provided by the legislative body. It reads:
The county board may provide for the appointment of a
board of adjustment, and in the regulations . . . may
provide that the board of adjustment may, in appropriate
cases and subject to appropriate conditions and
safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the
ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and intent
and in accordance with general or specific rules therein
contained.49
Special exceptions often take the form of conditional uses. These
are a second category of uses provided for by the legislature in the
textual description of each zone. The first category of uses within each
zone consists of the uses that owners may make of property within the
zone without having to obtain any prior approval by any governmental
48. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) (2005-2006).
49. Id. § 59.694(1) (emphasis added).
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agency." The second category is comprised of the conditional uses the
owner might make if the ZBA finds that the use will meet, in the words
of the statute, the "general or specific rules" or conditions established by
the legislature in the ordinance.' The inclusion of conditional uses for a
zone reflects the decision that the conditional use, under appropriate
conditions, could be compatible with the uses permitted in the zone as a
matter of right. For instance, in the most restrictive residential zone
permitted in the City of Milwaukee, the RS-1 zone, the uses permitted
as a matter of right are single-family residences. 2 But under conditions
set out in the ordinance, the ZBA may also permit family day care
homes, adult family homes, and day care centers." The conditions for a
family day care home include, for instance, that the operator "reside in
the dwelling unit.""
Some communities do not permit any conditional uses and limit
special exceptions to the dimension limitations for a zone. In the
Village of Whitefish Bay, for instance, the zoning ordinance provides for
no special uses unless explicitly permitted in a particular provision.5
The only provisions that allow special exceptions are dimension
limitations. 6
The careful provision in the enabling statute for special exceptions
"subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards" and "in accordance
with general or specific rules" set out in the ordinance by the
legislature,57 and the precise way in which these special exceptions are
created in ordinances, would appear to be patently at odds with the idea
that ZBAs might have additional and substantial discretion under the
variance provision to provide relief from the strictures of the ordinance
50. The owner very likely will have to obtain a building permit for a new improvement
on the property, and the application for the building permit will be reviewed by the
municipality's city engineer or building staff, and perhaps by an architectural review
committee. Those reviews focus on the plans for the improvement and their adequacy under
the municipality's building codes and design guidelines. The owner does not need permission
for the use.
51. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(1).
52. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES: BUILDING AND ZONING CODE § 295-
503 (2007).
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 295-503-2e.
55. See WHITEFISH BAY, WIS., ZONING CODE § 16.20(3)(a) (2007) ("The Board of
Appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stats. [§] 62.23(7)(e) and after appropriate notice and hearing, may
grant a special exception to a requirement imposed by the Zoning Code, when the section of
the Zoning Code which imposes such requirement expressly allows for special exceptions.").
56. Id. § 16.20(3)(d).
57. WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e)1 (2005-2006).
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whenever the ZBA felt that the owner's desires would not be dissonant
with the neighborhood. If a ZBA had that kind of discretion under the
variance provision, the special use provision would hardly seem to be at
all necessary; it would be subsumed within the variance power. The
most reasonable inference to be drawn from the special exception
provisions, therefore, has to be that the power of ZBAs under the
variance provision is limited to the extraordinary circumstances
described in that provision.
The third power of ZBAs under the enabling statutes is the power
"[t]o hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is an error in any
order, requirement, decision or determination made by an
administrative official in the enforcement" of the ordinance." The
power to correct "errors" suggests that there is a standard in the
ordinance for determining when an administrative official of the
municipality has made a correct determination or has fallen into error.
That standard consists of the specifications for the various zones set out
by the legislative body in the definitions of the zones. Once again, this
power, just like the other powers given to ZBAs, suggests a quasi-
judicial function at best.5 9 The ZBAs, in exercising each of their
responsibilities, are to make findings of fact, or perhaps findings of
mixed law and fact, according to standards established by the legislature,
and, based on their findings, are to grant or deny applications submitted
by property owners. There is nothing in the provisions of the enabling
statute defining these functions that suggests that ZBAs were intended
to have broad discretion.
Thus, ZBAs are denied broad discretion in part because of their
status as unelected agencies as well as their limited jurisdiction.
58. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(a) (2005-2006); see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7(a) (1926); WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e) (2005-
2006).
59. But see Osterhues v. Bd. of Adjustment for Washburn County, 2005 WI 92, 282
Wis. 2d 228, 698 N.W.2d 701. This decision, handed down a year after Ziervogel and
Waushara County, further advances the court's misunderstanding of the limited role of ZBAs
in the scheme of land use regulation. In Osterhues, the court held that ZBAs, under their
power to hear appeals from the decisions of administrators, could go beyond correcting
merely legal errors and could in addition correct equitable errors, thus further underscoring
the court's view of ZBAs as iibertribunals of justice in land use affairs. Id. $ 43, 282 Wis. 2d
228, $ 43, 698 N.W.2d 701, $ 43. It is not at all clear what principles are to guide the equitable
decisions of ZBAs in this role. Most importantly, granting ZBAs essentially unbounded
equitable powers is inconsistent with the statutory descriptions of the more specific remedies
of variances and special uses, both of which are circumscribed by exacting conditions.
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III. THE JUDICIAL ROOTS OF WISCONSIN VARIANCE LAW: SNYDER
AND KENOSHA COUNTY
Justice Sykes, writing for the majority in Ziervogel, claimed to be
returning Wisconsin variance law to its roots-to a bifurcated standard
established in the court's 1976 decision in Snyder v. Waukesha County
Zoning Board of Adjustment.60 She also insisted that the court
erroneously departed from that root in its more recent decision in 1998
in State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment.6' Even a superficial
reading of Snyder, however, reveals that Snyder rejected a lesser
standard for dimension variances and insisted that the sole standard for
both use and dimension variances was the traditional "no economically
beneficial use." 62  Thus, Kenosha County, far from perverting the
established standard, merely followed Snyder in refusing to make the
hardship standard for dimension variances relative to the desires of an
owner.
A. Snyder v. Waukesha County Board of Adjustment
The issue in Snyder and the court's immediate approach to the issue
alone demonstrate that the court was unwilling to adopt a lesser
standard for dimension variances. The plaintiff in Snyder had been
denied a variance by the Waukesha County Zoning Board for a porch
because the porch would only "increase the nonconformity of an already
nonconforming structure., 63  The plaintiff relied on the fact that the
county ordinance authorized variances for either "practical difficulties
or unnecessary hardships" and argued therefore that his request for an
area variance be granted under the lesser standard of practical
difficulty.6
The court noted, however, that contrary to the language of the
county's ordinance, the state enabling statute for counties established
60. State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, If 25-
29, 269 Wis. 2d 549, $1 25-29, 676 N.W.2d 401, 25-29 (citing Snyder v. Waukesha County
Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468,247 N.W.2d 98 (1976)).
61. Id. 27-30, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 1$ 27-30, 676 N.W.2d 401, 1 27-30 (citing State v.
Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998)).
62. See Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474, 247 N.W.2d at 102.
63. Id. at 475, 247 N.W.2d at 102.
64. Id. at 472, 247 N.W.2d at 101. The Waukesha County Shoreland and Floodland
Protection Ordinance uses both "practical difficulties" and "unnecessary hardship," id. at 472,
247 N.W.2d at 101 (quoting WAUKESHA COUNTY, WIS., SHORELAND AND FLOODLAND
PROTECTION ORDINANCE § 17.03(l)(c)), where the enabling statute for counties, as we have
seen, uses only the term "unnecessary hardship."
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only the single standard of unnecessary hardship.65 The court observed,
"Thus, because [the state enabling statute] does not include the element
of practical difficulty while the ordinance does, a question arises as to
the relevance of appellant's arguments relating to claimed practical
difficulty." 66 The court resolved the problem, and avoided a conflict
between the enabling statute and the county ordinance, by finding that
the two terms meant the same thing.67 "However," the court said,
"although the terms 'unnecessary hardship' and 'practical difficulty' are
insusceptible to precise definition and are often stated disjunctively in
zoning enactments, the authorities generally recognize that there is no
practical difference between them."'  Consequently, the court held,
"This conclusion permits the court to consider appellant's claims of
practical difficulty despite the fact that [the state enabling statute]
empowering the board of adjustment to authorize variances, refers only
to unnecessary hardship." 69 Thus, Professor Daniel Mandelker, in his
preeminent treatise on land use, accurately cites Snyder as among the
paradigmatic examples of courts refusing to adopt two standards for
hardship when the enabling statute refers only to the one standard of
"unnecessary hardship., 70
Turning to the definition of "unnecessary hardship," and by
implication "practical difficulty," the court looked back to its own then
relatively recent decision in State ex rel. Markdale Corp. v. Board of
Appeals of City of Milwaukee71 in which it held that "[s]ince the main
purpose of allowing variances is to prevent land from being rendered
useless, 'unnecessary hardship' can best be defined as a situation where
in the absence of a variance no feasible use can be made of the land.,
72
Clearly, if "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulty" mean the
same thing, and "unnecessary hardship" means "no feasible use," then
"practical difficulty" also means "no feasible use," and there is no
65. Id. at 472, 247 N.W.2d at 101.
66. Id. at 472, 247 N.W.2d at 101.
67. Id. at 472, 247 N.W.2d at 101.
68. Id. at 472-73, 247 N.W.2d at 101 (citing, 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING 45-20 (3d ed. 1972)) ("The overlapping of the concepts of practical difficulty and
undue hardship in so many factual situations and the lack of real reason for treating the two
situations differently, has caused courts to treat the two terms as if they were synonymous."
(quoting 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 45-20 (3d ed. 1972))).
69. Id. at 474, 247 N.W.2d at 102.
70. MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 6.48 n.2.
71. 27 Wis. 2d 154, 133 N.W.2d 795 (1965).
72. Id. at 163, 133 N.W.2d at 799 (citation omitted) (quoted in Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474,
247 N.W.2d at 102).
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difference between the hardship standards for uses and dimensions.
The court also offered an acutely perceptive explanation for why
some might mistakenly believe that the definition of hardship for
dimension variances was easier to meet than the definition for uses. The
error was the result of failing to recognize that the term "unnecessary
hardship" is not a single concept or condition. In fact, the term
mentions two distinct conditions: (i) hardship and (ii) the lack of any
necessity for the hardship. As the court observed,
[T]he fact that area variances are considerably easier to
obtain than use variances creates the impression that a
minimal showing of difficulty will establish the element
of practical difficulty and entitle the landowner to a
variance. However, area variances are not more easily
obtained because practical difficulties are something
much less severe than unnecessary hardship, but because
area variances do not involve great changes in the
character of neighborhoods as do use variances. This
relates to what hardships or practical difficulties may be
considered unnecessary or unreasonable in light of the
purpose of the zoning law.73
In this passage, the court not only clarifies that "unnecessary hardship"
is not a single blended condition, it also underscores its earlier holding
that a minimal showing of difficulty is not sufficient to grant an area
variance.
Perhaps the only place in the court's opinion that might be read to
have suggested a different standard for area variances is where it
appears to offer a distinct articulation of a test for area variances. It
says, following the discussion already related,
When considering an area variance, the question of
whether unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty
exists is best explained as "[w]hether compliance with the
strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set backs,
frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably
prevent the owner from using the property for a
permitted purpose or would render conformity with such
restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.
71
73. Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473, 247 N.W.2d at 101-02 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 474-75, 247 N.W.2d at 102 (quoting 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
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If we eliminate the words "unreasonably" and "unnecessarily" in
keeping with the court's own admonition not to confuse the condition of
necessity with the distinct condition of hardship, then this test does no
more than reiterate that hardship means unable to use the property for a
permitted purpose, or burdensome. It is only the appearance of the
latter term, ambiguously stated in the alternative, that suggests that the
test for area variances may be less than no economic use. However, the
court had already flatly stated that the test for area variances was not
less than the test for use variances.75 In addition, if burdensomeness was
less than "unable to use the property for a permitted purpose," there
would be no point in including the more severe term in the definition of
the test for area variances because, presumably, no one would be
required to meet it. Consequently, in the context of the discussion
immediately preceding this passage, the term "burdensome" has to be
read to mean the same thing as "unable to use the property for a
permitted purpose," and the appearance of both terms in the passage
needs to be recognized for what it unquestionably is: just a bit of
lawyer's prolixity.
Even if the mention of "burdensomeness" had created an ambiguity,
the ambiguity was surely put to rest by the court's own treatment of the
facts of the case. The plaintiff applied for a variance to be able to add a
porch to his home on Lac La Belle in the town of Oconomowoc. 6 The
porch would have encroached on the side offsets by at least seven feet,
four inches and, including the intended roofline, at most by nine feet,
four inches.7 The court first emphasized that any hardship had to be the
result of unique features of the property. It held: "[T]he offset
PLANNING 45-28 (3d ed. 1972)).
75. Id. at 473, 247 N.W.2d at 102.
76. Id. at 469, 247 N.W.2d at 100 (from the editor's abstract).
77. Id. at 470-71, 247 N.W.2d at 100 (from the editor's abstract). The facts are actually
slightly more complicated. The town's building inspector, as the result of a misunderstanding
about the offsets, had mistakenly given the plaintiff verbal permission to build the porch. Id.
at 470, 247 N.W.2d at 100 (from the editor's abstract). The inspector caught the error only
after the porch had been substantially completed and a neighbor complained about the
encroachment. Id. at 470, 247 N.W.2d at 100 (from the editor's abstract). Consequently, the
plaintiff applied for a variance only after nearly completing the construction. Id. at 470, 247
N.W.2d at 100 (from the editor's abstract). The plaintiff argued, among other things, that
having to remove the porch would itself either constitute or contribute to the unnecessary
hardship of having to meet the setbacks. Id. at 475, 247 N.W.2d at 102. Despite the waste,
the court held the plaintiff to the standards of the ordinance because, the court found, any
hardship caused by the construction was self-created. See id. at 476, 247 N.W.2d at 103. Even
in the absence of the porch, the house was already a nonconforming structure. The existing
nonconformity does not appear to have been a factor in the court's decision.
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requirement placed upon appellant's lot is not unique or peculiar to his
property, for it applies equally to all lots of similar size. Because the
restriction does not especially affect appellant's lot, it may not constitute
hardship or difficulties which justify a variance. '" 78
Turning specifically to the application of the hardship threshold, the
court described the plaintiff's expressed need as follows: "Appellant
claims he needs this porch to enjoy lake living, to accommodate his
expanded family, and to increase the value of his land., 79 Once again,
the court reiterated that the standard for area variances is no less than
the standard for use variances, and it then rejected the plaintiff's
interests as altogether irrelevant: "Outside of New York," the court
observed, "where a minimal showing of practical difficulties will justify
an area variance, the authorities indicate that a showing of natural
growth of a family and personal inconvenience do not constitute
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship which justify a variance.
'' s
Having concluded that there was no hardship, the court did not even
consider whether the variance would be harmonious with the
legislature's plan for the neighborhood. It concluded simply that "the
evidence establishes that the appellant's claimed practical difficulty or
hardship relied upon for granting the variance is ...no more than
personal inconvenience. '" 8'
It could not be much clearer that in both word and deed the court in
Snyder rejected a unique and lesser standard for area variances that was
relative to the owner's desires for his property. The test is the objective
standard of no reasonable use, not the relative standard of the owner's
desire. In both Ziervogel and Waushara County, the court neglected to
read Snyder in any way approaching thoroughness. It did not
acknowledge the telling issue in Snyder, and it did not revisit the court's
analysis of the law or the court's relentless application of that law to the
facts. In both recent decisions, the court did no more than to
superficially quote Snyder's reference to "burdensome" in addition to
"unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property for a
permitted purpose." As we have seen, that reference in the complete
context of the discussion in Snyder is most accurately seen as no more
than a trivial instance of lawyer's prolixity.
78. Id. at 477, 247 N.W.2d at 103 (citing ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING § 14.55, at 32 (1968); 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.167,
at 543-45 (3d ed. 1965)).
79. Id. at 478, 247 N.W.2d at 104.
80. Id. at 478, 247 N.W.2d at 104.
81. Id. at 479, 247 N.W.2d at 104.
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B. State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment
The court in Ziervogel insisted that its predecessors in 1998 in State
v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment' had strayed from Snyder's
lesson that the standard of hardship for dimension variances demanded
less of owners.83 By insisting on a single standard for all variances, the
court claimed, Kenosha County departed from reason and precedentY
Read in light of the foregoing discussion, however, Kenosha County
appears to be solidly among the ranks of decisions in Wisconsin,
exemplified by Snyder, and around the country, treating variances as
they were intended-as extraordinary remedies for extraordinary
circumstances. Kenosha County, contrary to the claim of the court in
Ziervogel, is thus yet another illustration of the original understanding
and intended operation of the variance provision.
The plaintiff in Kenosha County owned a house on Hooker Lake in
the Town of Salem in Kenosha County." She wanted to construct a
deck off the front of the house extending towards the lake.86 Under the
county's zoning ordinance, the required setback from the lake was
seventy-five feet, as demanded by the state's shoreland statute.87
Without the porch, the house sat seventy-eight feet from the water,
three feet farther than required by the setback. 88 The porch, however,
would have caused the house to encroach on the setback by eleven
feet.89 In support of her application for a variance, the plaintiff testified
merely that "a deck would update the house, make the house look more
attractive, and be used for recreational purposes and a view of the
lake."'
Consistent with the rogue modus operandi of ZBAs reported in the
Klimczyk survey,9' the ZBA for Kenosha County unanimously granted
the application.92 In support of its decision, it offered findings that had
nothing to do with the legal standards for variances. There was no
82. 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998).
83. State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, 26-
31, 269 Wis. 2d 549, %% 26-31, 676 N.W.2d 401, % 26-31.
84. Id. 1$ 27, 31, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 91 27, 31, 676 N.W.2d 401, 1 27, 31.
85. 218 Wis. 2d at 399, 577 N.W.2d at 816.
86. Id. at 399, 577 N.W.2d at 816.
87. Id. at 400, 577 N.W.2d at 816.
88. Id. at 399, 577 N.W.2d at 816.
89. See id. at 399, 577 N.W.2d at 816.
90. Id. at 401,577 N.W.2d at 817.
91. See generally Klimczyk, supra note 3.
92. Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 399, 577 N.W.2d at 817.
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finding of a special condition of the property or, as required by Snyder, a
finding of no reasonable use of the property absent the variance.93 The
ZBA merely found that other properties were even closer to the lake,
that petitioner's request was modest, that homes built prior to the
enactment were entitled to special considerations (especially homes on
the lake for which owners paid higher taxes), and that to deny the
request "would be confiscatory and unreasonable."9 4 After a second
hearing prompted by the DNR's appeal of the grant, the ZBA
supplemented its finding.9 The supplementary findings, however, were
still far afield of the legal requirements. It found, for instance, that the
property owner's "case would be unnecessarily burdensome because she
would be denied a use that a great many other lakefront property
owners do enjoy" and that the plaintiff faced unique conditions because
her property sloped from the front of the house to the shoreline.'
Without any supporting evidence in the record, the ZBA also opined
that the deck would provide a safety barrier.'
What is particularly interesting about Kenosha County is that the
county's own ordinance explicitly demanded special conditions in two
places and defined "unnecessary hardship" as "no reasonable use." In a
set of guidelines addressed to the ZBA, the ordinance included: "[t]hat
the existence of these special conditions will restrict the use of the land
if the Ordinance is applied literally so as to render the land useless." 98
The definition of "unnecessary hardship" in the ordinance stated,
"Unnecessary hardship is present only where, in the absence of a
variance, no feasible use can be made of the property."99 In granting the
variance to the plaintiff, the Kenosha County ZBA disregarded not only
the supreme court's decision in Snyder, it also demonstrated what we
now know to be a typical ignorance or utter disregard of its own
ordinance.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on the other hand, hewed closely to
its earlier decision in Snyder as well as to one of its more recent
93. Id. at 404, 577 N.W.2d at 818.
94. Id. at 402, 577 N.W.2d at 817.
95. Id. at 402-05, 577 N.W.2d at 817-18.
96. Id. at 404, 577 N.W.2d at 818.
97. Id. at 404-05, 577 N.W.2d at 818.
98. Id. at 408, 577 N.W.2d at 819 (quoting KENOSHA COUNTY, Wis., GENERAL ZONING
AND SHORELAND/FLOODPLAIN ZONING ORDINANCE § 12.36-13).
99. Id. at 409, 577 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting KENOSHA COUNTY, WIS., GENERAL ZONING
AND SHORELAND/FLOODPLAIN ZONING ORDINANCE app. A).
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intervening decisions, Arndorfer v. Sauk County Board of Adjustment."
Citing Arndorfer, the court first insisted that "[p]roof of unnecessary
hardship includes the burden of proving 'uniqueness."" 0' The limitation
was "essential," the court explained, again quoting Arndorfer, "to
'prevent the purposes of the zoning regulations from being undermined
by the granting of piecemeal exceptions to those regulations.' ' 2 The
court recognized and honored the distinct and limited role of the local
commission in contrast to the more comprehensive policy-making role
of the legislature: "'where the hardship imposed on the applicant's land
is shared by nearby land, relief should be addressed through the
legislative, rather than administrative means.", 0 3 In Kenosha County,
there was no evidence presented that the plaintiff's property differed in
any way from that of her neighbors. On the contrary, in granting the
variance, the ZBA relied on the fact that many other properties already
encroached on the setback."' The supreme court held that "[t]he fact
that [the property owner's] home and deck may be visually compatible
with thecharacter of other homes on Hooker Lake is not a factor for the
Board to use in determining, in this specific case,whether [the property
owner] has a reasonable use of her property without the deck."'0 5
Though the lack of a special condition would have been sufficient to
overturn the grant of the variance, the court also addressed the lack of
the appropriate hardship. The court stated, "We agree that the State's
definition of unnecessary hardship-no reasonable use of the property
without a variance-is compatible with the concerns we expressed in
Snyder."' 6  The Kenosha County court also drew support from an
intervening court of appeals decision, State v. Winnebago County, 7
which held that "the proper test is not whether a variance would
100. 162 Wis. 2d 246, 469 N.W.2d 831 (1991). Arndorfer is unique among the supreme
court's decisions in that the facts involved an application for a structural variance to permit
the installation of holding tanks instead of some other sewage disposal system. Id. at 249, 469
N.W.2d at 832. The court's discussion in Arndorfer is nonetheless a model of the traditional
demand for unique conditions and hardship as threshold issues.
101. Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 410, 577 N.W.2d at 820 (citing Arndorfer, 162 Wis.
2d at 254, 469 N.W.2d at 834).
102. Id. at 413, 577 N.W.2d at 821 (quoting Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 255, 469 N.W.2d at
834).
103. Id. at 420, 577 N.W.2d at 824 (quoting State v. Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d 836,
846, 540 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1995)).
104. Id. at 415, 577 N.W.2d at 822.
105. 'Id. at 417, 577 N.W.2d at 823.
106. Id. at 413, 577 N.W.2d at 821.
107. 196 Wis. 2d 836, 540 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1995).
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maximize the economic value of the property, but whether a feasible use
is possible without the variance."' ' As to the plaintiff's application and
the ZBA's findings, the court stated that "this court in Winnebago held
that maximizing economic value of the property is not a proper test for
determining unnecessary hardship."' '° In language that might have been
drawn directly from Snyder, the court concluded that, "[w]hile loss of
economic value is not the sole reason why the Board granted the
variance in this case, [the property owner's] projected loss of value
cannot be bootstrapped to a deck that is merely a personal convenience,
and form a sufficient basis for a variance."" ° As in Snyder and decisions
of the court of appeals following Snyder, the court distinguished true
hardships from the mere frustration of the desires of the owner, the
latter being no more than a "personal convenience.."...
Far from being a radical departure from Snyder, Kenosha County
was a virtual replay of Snyder right down to the porches for which the
owners sought variances. Also implicit in the court's broad research and
reliance on precedent in Kenosha County is that Kenosha County was
not even unique after Snyder in applying a very strict and single
standard for hardship. Kenosha County relied on one of its own
intervening decisions, Arndorfer, and on one opinion from the court of
appeals, Winnebago County.
IV. THE ACTIVISM OF ZIERVOGEL AND WAUSHARA COUNTY
A. An Ominous Foreshadowing
In 2001, barely three years after Kenosha County, the court decided
State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment."2 Outagamie County
foreshadowed the court's decisions in Ziervogel and Waushara County,
but it decisively failed to overturn the single standard for hardship only
because the court splintered, with no opinion attracting a majority.
Nonetheless, Justice Sykes, newly appointed to the court since Kenosha
County, wrote the lead opinion that introduced the themes that would
108. Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 413, 577 N.W.2d at 822 (citing Winnebago County,
196 Wis. 2d at 846, 540 N.W.2d at 9).
109. Id. at 418-19, 577 N.W.2d at 824. The court was mistaken in referring to
Winnebago County as one of its own decisions; Winnebago County was a decision of the court
of appeals. Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d 836, 540 N.W.2d 6.
110. Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 419, 577 N.W.2d at 824.
111. Id. at 419, 577 N.W.2d at 824.
112. 2001 WI 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613,628 N.W.2d 376.
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later find majorities in Ziervogel and Waushara County."3 Justice
Crooks's concurring opinion in Outagamie County is interesting if for no
other reason than as a curious contrast to his later opinion for the
majority in Waushara County.
Outagamie County involved a familiar set of facts: the homeowners
wanted to build a sun porch."' But in this case, they were stopped by
the fact that their house was an illegal, nonconforming use; it was built
in violation of an already existing regulation."5 The owners' property
was in a flood fringe area under the applicable county shoreland-
floodplain-wetland ordinance, which required that the first floor of a
residential building located in such an area, including a basement, be
two feet above the regional flood elevation. ' 16 The owners' basement
well exceeded the limit."'  The owners sought a variance for the
basement after the county zoning administrator denied them a building
permit for the porch because of the nonconforming basement."' The
county ZBA unanimously granted the owners a variance, which was
upheld by the district court but reversed by the court of appeals based
on Kenosha County."'
The supreme court split three ways. Justice Sykes, writing for
herself and Justices Bablitch and Prosser, would have overturned
Kenosha County and adopted a lesser standard of hardship for area
variances.20  Justice Crooks, writing for himself and Justice Wilcox,
concurred in a part of Justice Sykes's opinion, which is not relevant
here, but refused to overrule Kenosha County and refused to adopt a
lower standard of hardship for area variances, though he offered an
interpretation of Snyder that would have permitted ZBAs vastly more
113. How the court went from unanimously upholding the traditional understanding of
variance law in Kenosha County to radically revising the law just three years later is explained
by the usual mechanism-a change in membership. In 1998, the same year the court decided
Kenosha County, Justice David Prosser replaced Justice Janine Geske, the author of the
court's opinion in Kenosha County. One year later, Justice Diane Sykes replaced Justice
Donald Steinmetz. Between the two appointments, it would appear that the appointment of
Justice Sykes was the more decisive for the court's radical shift in its approach to variances.
Justice Sykes wrote the plurality opinion in Outagamie County and the court's opinion in
Ziervogel.
114. 2001 WI 78, 13, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 13, 628 N.W.2d 376, 13.
115. Id. 13, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 1 13, 628 N.W.2d 376, 13.
116. Id. 9T 8-9, 244 Wis. 2d 613, J 8-9, 628 N.W.2d 376, T T 8-9.
117. Id. 9% 12, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 12, 628 N.W.2d 376, 91 12.
1.18. Id. T[ 13-14, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 11 13-14, 628 N.W.2d 376, 1 13-14.
119. Id. T[ 17-20, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 1 T 17-20, 628 N.W.2d 376, 91 17-20.
120. Id. $1 5, 244 Wis. 2d 613, % 5, 628 N.W.2d 376, 5.
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discretion than had ever been previously recognized. 2' Justice
Abrahamson dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Bradley. 2
1. Justice Sykes's Lead Opinion
Justice Sykes's opinion is the most interesting and complex. Though
arguably it makes the greatest number of mistakes, the mistakes
together nonetheless form a coherent philosophical picture. Justice
Sykes first insisted that Kenosha County mistakenly departed from the
rule in Snyder: "Kenosha County purported to be faithful to Snyder and
to the rule of deference to the discretion of boards of adjustment, when
indeed it was not.' ' 3 Snyder, Justice Sykes claimed, had established a
distinct and lower threshold of hardship for area variances: "our law has
always treated use variances differently from area variances because of
the different purposes underlying use and area zoning."'' 4 That claim is
based, however, on a misreading of Snyder's explanation for why some
people might mistakenly think that the hardship standard for area
variances is lower than the hardship standard for uses. Recall that
Snyder first held that there was no difference between the terms
"unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulties" that appeared in the
county ordinance that governed that case.2 ' The court interpreted the
two terms alike, in part to avoid a conflict with the state enabling statute
that mentioned only the one term-"unnecessary hardship."'26 It then
explained that some might have the misperception that there is a
different standard for area variances because they fail to recognize that
the term "unnecessary hardship" expresses two distinct standards:
hardship and whether the hardship is necessary to serve the public ends
reflected in the ordinance.2 7 Though the standard of hardship might be
identical for both uses and areas, area variances will be easier to obtain
because they are seldom as dissonant with their neighbors as are use
variances. Consequently, denying the variance will not be necessary as
121. Id. TT 71-80, 244 Wis. 2d 613, TT 71-80, 628 N.W.2d 376, TT 71-80 (Crooks, J.,
concurring).
122. Id. TT 119, 150, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 91 119, 150, 628 N.W.2d 376, TT 119, 150
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. T 32, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 32, 628 N.W.2d 376, 32 (majority opinion).
124. Id. 34, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 34, 628 N.W.2d 376, 1 34 (citing Snyder v. Washington
County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 473-75, 247 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (1976)).
125. Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473-75, 247 N.W.2d at 101-02.
126. Id. at 472, 247 N.W.2d at 101.
127. Id. at 473-74, 247 N.W.2d at 101-02.
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often to protect the character of the neighborhood.' 28
Justice Sykes made the precise error that the court in Snyder warned
against; she treated "unnecessary hardship" as if it were a single
concept.'29 That mistake then quite naturally led her to conceive of the
test for "unnecessary hardship" as involving a balancing of the public
interest against the burden of the regulation to the owners' desires:
[B]ecause area variances do not generally change
neighborhood character, "unnecessary hardship" in area
variance cases is measured against a lower standard
relating to the nature of the area restriction in question,
that is, whether compliance with the particular area
restriction would "unreasonably prevent the owner from
using the property for a permitted purpose" or be
"unnecessarily burdensome. ' .
The correct analysis under Snyder and every other Wisconsin
decision prior to Outagamie County treats both uniqueness and hardship
as threshold questions apart from necessity.'3 ' The ZBA does not
address the necessity of the hardship until it first determines that there
are special conditions affecting the property that make it impossible for
the owner to make any economically beneficial use of the property
consistent with the land use ordinances. Only if the owner's
circumstance reaches the threshold is the ZBA authorized to consider
whether enforcing the regulations that create the hardship is
nonetheless necessary to achieve the public policy goals of the
ordinance. Snyder itself is a perfect example of the methodology.
Because the court in Snyder found that neither the threshold for
uniqueness nor the threshold for hardship had been satisfied, it did not
address the necessity of the nonexistent hardship.
Justice Sykes's second error is more subtle, complex, and interesting,
and is also undoubtedly the motivation for her decision. She
misconceived the constitutional ends of the variance and the limited role
of the ZBA in resolving potential constitutional issues and failed to
128. Id. at 473-74, 247 N.W.2d at 101-02.
129. See Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78, 38, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 38, 628 N.W.2d 376,
38.
130. Id. [ 38, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 38, 628 N.W.2d 376, 38 (quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at
475, 247 N.W.2d at 102).




acknowledge altogether the place of the municipal legislature in
addressing circumstances that exceed the appropriately limited
authority of an appointed board. In other words, she vastly overstated
the constitutional issues and treated the ZBA as the sole governmental
arm for relieving owners of burdens to constitutionally protected rights.
Her conception of the variance is apparent in her statement of the issue.
After first declaring that Kenosha County was an erroneous departure
from the court's precedent, she said: "But more fundamentally, this case
is about individual private property rights, the scope of the police power
to regulate them through zoning, and the statutory authority of local
boards to strike a balance between the two through variances."' 32
In light of this conception of the function of variances, she quite
naturally then regarded any stricter standard for area variances as an
unwarranted contraction of the discretion of ZBAs to serve this
important task of doing justice. 3 She said,
Kenosha County mistakenly merged the previously
distinct standards for measuring "unnecessary hardship"
in area and use variances .... This has robbed boards of
adjustment of the discretion explicitly vested in them by
the legislature as a hedge against the individual injustices
that occasionally result from the application of otherwise
inflexible zoning regulations."
Justice Sykes is surely correct that the variance provision is intended
to serve the ends of justice and constitutional rights. But crucial
questions still remain: which constitutionally protected rights, which
concern of justice, and how is the variance provision intended to serve
those ends? Just as Justice Sykes failed to offer any analysis of the
132. Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78, 7, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 7, 628 N.W.2d 376, 7 7.
Justice Sykes repeats this theme many times in her discussion. See, e.g., id. 41-47, 244
Wis. 2d 613, 41-47, 628 N.W.2d 376, T 41-47.
133. This leaves an interesting question: if the stakes are so high, why shouldn't the ZBA
have similar discretion to do justice in cases of use variances? Justice Sykes's explanation
hinges on what she perceives to be the distinct purposes of use restrictions as opposed to
dimension regulations. See id. 1 38, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 38, 628 N.W.2d 376, 1 38 ("Thus,
because variances from use restrictions have the potential to bring about greater changes in
neighborhood character, 'unnecessary hardship' in use variance cases is measured against a
higher standard ...."). The distinction is not convincing, however. Presumably the greater
impact of a use variance could simply and easily be accommodated within the test that Justice
Sykes prescribes for area variances. Indeed, that is precisely the reason given by the Snyder
court why use variances are harder to obtain than area variances.
134. Id. 1 32, 244 Wis. 2d 613, T 32,628 N.W.2d 376, 1 32.
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explicit conditions set out for the variance in the enabling statute, she
similarly failed to identify which constitutionally protected rights she
was referring to. In her statement of the issue, she indiscriminately
blended together unspecified issues of property rights with issues of the
definition of the police power. That admixture suggests that she
invoked something like a federal substantive due process right.
Substantive due process is most fundamentally the right not to have
one's liberty curtailed without a good reason. That would appear to be
the idea reflected in Justice Sykes's understanding that a determination
of unnecessary hardship requires a balance of the desires of the property
owner against the needs of the community.
There are at least two serious problems with that vague invocation
of substantive due process as an explanation for the creation of
variances. In the first instance, the right that Justice Sykes built into the
variance provision vastly exceeds the rights given under modern
substantive due process and would delegate to a local, non-professional,
volunteer administrative board discretion that even the federal judiciary
has not claimed since the Lochner35 Era. Modern substantive due
process focuses quite narrowly on whether legislation is directed at an
adequate purpose. The search for an adequate purpose is understood to
be identical to the inquiry into whether, under state constitutional law, a
statute is within the police power, a power defined by the ends that the
legislature may pursue: the promotion of the health, welfare and safety
of the people of the state.36 For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court's
classic zoning decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 13 7 the
Court said of the two constitutional doctrines,
It is not necessary to set forth the provisions of the Ohio
Constitution which are thought to be infringed. The
question is the same under both Constitutions,
namely... : Is the ordinance invalid, in that it violates
the constitutional protection "to the right of property in
the appellee by attempted regulations under the guise of
the police power, which are unreasonable and
135. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner still represents the high water
mark of the Court's wholesale disregard of the fundamental principle of separation of powers,
the limits of its own constitutional authority, and the policy-making role of the legislatures.
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3 (7th
ed. 2004).
136. See State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89,106-08, 114 N.W.137, 140-41 (1907).





Later in that opinion, addressing the reasons supporting zoning in
general, the Court further clarified the inquiry: "the reasons are
sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before
the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'39  Professor
Mandelker summarizes the law of substantive due process in the context
of land use regulations as follows:
Land use controls must satisfy the substantive limitations
imposed on land use regulation by the due process
clause. Courts interpret this clause to mean that land use
controls must advance legitimate governmental interests
that serve the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. State zoning legislation restates these purposes
as the guiding objectives in land use regulation, though
the general welfare predominates in this litany of police
power nouns. Whether land use regulation serves the
general welfare is the major substantive due process
question.""
Nowhere in the Court's modern decisions concerning substantive due
process or in the treatises is it suggested that it would be appropriate for
the courts to balance the public interest against the desires of a property
141owner.
138. Id. at 386.
139. Id. at 395.
140. MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 2.39 (citation omitted).
141. In a number of early regulatory takings cases, the Court indicated that the burden
of a land use regulation on a property owner was to be balanced against the public interest.
The high water mark of that jurisprudence, as well as its last gasp, was the Court's decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). That balancing
aspect of the early doctrine reflected the Court's failure to unravel the early substantive due
process aspect of the Court's seminal decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), from its discussion of the takings clause. See generally Robert Brauneis, "The
Foundation of our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence"" The Myth and Meaning of Justice
Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
Following Penn Central, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), converted the public interest from a counterweight in a balance of public and
private interests into a bright line nuisance exception. Under the nuisance exception, a
regulation that would otherwise be deemed a taking because of its effect on the ability of an
owner to use his property will not be deemed to be a taking if it does no more than duplicate
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Beyond the precise focus of the doctrine on legitimate ends, the
Supreme Court, honoring principles of separation of powers, insisted
that the inquiry defer to the implicit determinations of the legislature
that any challenged regulation does indeed serve a legitimate health,
welfare, or safety need.14 As the Court indicated in the quote from
Euclid above, the courts are to declare legislative acts invalid only if
there is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the regulation
is not directed at a legitimate end.'43 As Professor Mandelker observed,
"Judicial review in substantive due process cases is deferential, and
substantive due process objections to the purposes of land use
regulations do not usually succeed."'" If the Court eschews balancing in
the context of substantive due process out of a regard for its own
limitations as a judicial, non-policy-making body and the constitutional
policy-making role of the legislature, it would appear to be all the more
perverse to interpret the variance provision to delegate that extreme of
non-deference to legislative determinations to a mere local, amateur,
non-elected, appointed volunteer board. Justice Sykes's interpretation
of the constitutional underpinnings of the variance procedure appears to
create far more constitutional issues than it solves.
More fundamentally, however, there are other, less abstract reasons,
and reasons focused more precisely on the language and history of the
variance provision for rejecting Justice Sykes's expansive vision of the
rights protected by the variance provision and the proper role of ZBAs.
As we already saw in Part II, there is nothing in the provisions of the
state's enabling act for counties that suggests that these boards were
intended to exercise any but the most limited and guided authority. The
variance provision itself limits the availability of variances to
circumstances in which the property is burdened by a "special
condition" and, as a result of the special condition, the owner is unable
to develop the property consistent with the applicable regulations.'45 It
is only if the owner demonstrates that these threshold conditions have
been met that the ZBA is to consider whether granting the variance
would detract from the public policy reflected in the regulation. In that
context, the public interest is not a counterweight to be balanced against
the result that would have occurred under the state's traditional rules of private or public
nuisance. Id. at 1029. The theory is that the liberty to cause a nuisance was never part of an
owner's title, so denial of that liberty takes nothing. See id. at 1027.
142. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
143. Id.
144. MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 2.39.
145. See WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) (2005-2006).
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the owner's desires; it is yet another limitation or condition on the
ability of the owner to obtain a variance.
This interpretation of the power of a ZBA is also consistent with the
limitations on the other powers of the ZBA and their relationship to the
determinations of the legislature. ZBAs are authorized to grant special
exceptions, but only "in harmony with [an ordinance's] general purpose
and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein
contained."' 6  We have seen that in some communities, special
exceptions are limited to relief from area requirements. 47 The idea that
the variance procedure is yet another opportunity for owners to avoid
area requirements in the discretion of the ZBA would appear to be in
direct conflict with the limitations prescribed for special uses.
The only other power of the ZBA is to hear appeals from the
decisions of zoning administrators "where it is alleged there is error.'
1 8
The very idea of "error" implies a standard against which a decision of
an administrative official can be judged erroneous. This standard
appears in the ordinances as determined by the legislative body of the
municipality. All of these provisions demonstrate that ZBAs are to hew
closely to legislative determinations. There is nothing in these
provisions to suggest the expansive discretion that Justice Sykes
contemplated for ZBAs that would allow them, case by case, to
determine if the application of a regulation in a particular case is so
weighty as to justify the frustration of an owner's desire for his property.
In addition, the constitutional right and the principle of justice
served by variances is not substantive due process, even accurately
understood; rather it is patently the takings clause and the possibility of
a regulatory taking. The explicit language of the statutory variance
procedure recognizes that there may be circumstances in which a zone,
appropriate for most all of the land embraced, may nonetheless include
a parcel or two that is physically different from the other parcels and
different in ways that make it impossible for the owner to develop the
land consistent with the limitations of the regulation. Nowhere in her
opinion in Outagamie County does Justice Sykes acknowledge or discuss
the takings clause. 9 As emphasized earlier, though, the variance
146. Id. § 59.694(1).
147. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
148. WIS. STAT. § 59.694(7)(a).
149. Justice Sykes's preference for substantive due process over the takings clause is
especially perverse. The takings clause provides far greater protection to property interests
than does substantive due process. Substantive due process, properly understood, provides
protection only against arbitrary limitations to a person's liberty. Given the court's deference
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provision is not even intended to be the sole remedy for a potential
regulatory taking. Quite obviously, under the explicit conditions set out
in the statute, a ZBA is to deny a variance either if the condition that
makes it impossible to develop the land is not unique to the owner or if
the variance would be dissonant with the character of the neighborhood,
even if the owner can make no economically beneficial use of the land. In
that circumstance, implicit in the limitations of the statute, the remedy
for the problem is with the legislative, policy-making body of the
municipality with the advice of its professional planning commission-
not the unelected, volunteer, amateur board. That understanding of the
proper and complimentary roles of boards and legislatures has been
recognized repeatedly by courts, including the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Arndorfer.15 ° Once again, a proper understanding of the
statute's allocation of authority between boards and municipal
legislatures belies the broad discretion that Justice Sykes imagined for
ZBAs.
The capstone of Justice Sykes's transformation of the lowly ZBA
into the iiber land use justice commission is judicial deference. Judicial
deference to the decisions of ZBAs is not new. The court in Snyder
recalled that "[i]n reviewing the decisions of the adjustment board in
this case it must be kept in mind that the court is hesitant to interfere
with administrative determinations ... and accords the decision of the
board of adjustment a presumption of correctness and validity. 15.
Justice Sykes adds nothing rhetorically to this formulation. However, by
eliminating the uniqueness requirement as a practical limitation on the
availability of variances, making the hardship requirement relative to
the interests of the property owner, and allowing the boards to judge the
weight to be given to the legislature's regulations, she has reduced the
to legislative determinations, and the consequent burden on challengers, as Professor
Mandelker observes, it is virtually impossible to win a substantive due process challenge.
MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 2.39.
The takings clause, on the other hand, presumes that a regulation serves a legitimate
purpose but goes further and asks whether the regulation fairly allocates the costs of
providing a public benefit to the owner or whether it ought more fairly to be assumed by the
entire community. This is the great and enduring insight of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Justice Sykes reverses the preference only because of her inaccurately expansive
understanding of substantive due process as demanding a case-by-case balancing of private
frustration and public need.
150. Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 255-56, 469 N.W.2d
831, 834 (1991).
151. Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476, 247
N.W.2d 98, 103 (1976) (citations omitted).
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test to little more than a judgment call by a ZBA, case by case.
Under the more robust test for variances, the courts could at least
determine if the uniqueness requirement had been considered and
whether the evidence truly supported a decision judged against the
objective standard of no reasonable use. What was left for deference
was a decision by a ZBA that under the circumstances, granting the
variance would not unduly compromise the goals of the regulation from
which the variance was sought. For example, in Snyder itself, the
supreme court carefully evaluated the evidence behind the decision of
the board of adjustment that there was neither a hardship nor unique
circumstances.1 2  The court concluded its discussion by observing,
"[T]he evidence establishes that the appellant's claimed practical
difficulty or hardship relied upon for granting the variance is either self-
created or no more than personal inconvenience. Therefore, the board's
decision to refuse a variance was not unreasonable or without a rational
basis."'53 As mentioned earlier, the court in Snyder never reached the
issue of whether the requested variance would unduly compromise the
goals of the regulation.'54 There was no need since the property owner
had not satisfied the threshold issues.
In sharp contrast to the analysis in Snyder, Justice Sykes never
addressed the traditional threshold issues in Outagamie County and
instead leaped to the conclusion that
[t]he hardship suffered under either scenario-basically,
the complete loss of the basement-is substantial, far
outweighing the benefits of enforcing the strict letter of
the flood elevation requirements. True, one sure way to
avoid basement flood damage is to get rid of the
basement altogether, but this is such regulatory overkill
under the circumstances of this case that the Board's
action in granting the variance was completely justified.'55
Combining so stripped-down an inquiry by a board with judicial
deference leaves virtually nothing for a court to countermand and,
consequently, virtually eliminates judicial oversight and leaves the
amateur ZBAs as the final judge of every land use issue brought before
152. Id. at 479, 247 N.W.2d at 104.
153. Id. at 479, 247 N.W.2d at 104.
154. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
155. State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 52, 244 Wis. 2d 613,




2. Justice Crooks's Concurring Opinion
On first blush, Justice Crooks's concurring opinion in Outagamie
County looks as if it avoided all of the confounding errors in Justice
Sykes's opinion. He recognized that Snyder refused to endorse a
different and lower standard for area variances.'57 He acknowledged
that the proper definition of "unnecessary hardship" is no reasonable
use, though he attributed that definition to Kenosha County.'58 He even
seems to understand that whether the regulation creates a hardship for
an owner is distinct from the issue of its necessity in light of the public
need. He repeatedly quotes that part of Snyder where the Snyder court
drew a clear distinction between hardship and necessity in explaining
the misapprehension that hardship for area variances is less than
hardship for use variances, that in fact, the greater ease of obtaining an
area variance "relates to what hardships or practical difficulties may be
156. Slightly over a year after deciding Ziervogel and Waushara County, in Lamar
Central Outdoor, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Milwaukee, the court
acknowledged the statutory right of applicants to appeal the denial of variances by ZBAs.
2005 WI 117, TT 15-16, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 700 N.W.2d 87, TT 15-16. To assure the
meaningfulness of an appeal, the court required ZBAs to disclose their reasons for denying a
variance. Id. 39, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 39, 700 N.W.2d 87, 39. The court did not insist that
ZBAs prepare a written decision, however, and, in the absence of a written decision, the court
would review a transcript of the proceedings before the ZBA. Id. T 31, 284 Wis. 2d 1, T 31,
700 N.W.2d 87, T 31. In Lamar, the court overturned the denial of the variance and
remanded the application for reconsideration. Id. 39, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 39, 700 N.W.2d 87,
39. The court found that even the transcript did nothing more than recite the grounds laid
out in the ordinance, failed to refer to evidence in support of the finding, and was tainted by
one member's personal distaste for billboards. Id. TT 36-38, 284 Wis. 2d 1, T 36-38, 700
N.W.2d 87, TT 36-38.
These would appear to be minimal and welcome procedural requirements. The criticism
in the text focuses on the court's evisceration of the criteria for granting a variance and the
conversion of the test into a balance of the desires of the owner against the board's
assessment of the importance of the regulation in the particular situation. If a board recites
the facts of the case and explicitly exercises the extraordinary judgment bestowed by
Ziervogel and Waushara County, there remains much less for a reviewing court to review
even given the procedural requirements of Lamar.
157. Although, without citing any earlier Wisconsin decisions, Justice Crooks mistakenly
believed that Wisconsin law before Snyder recognized a standard of hardship for area
variances that was lower than the standard for use variances: "Prior to the time Snyder was
decided, area variances apparently were granted based upon a showing of 'practical
difficulties' which was 'something much less severe than unnecessary hardship' . . . Snyder
eliminated that distinction." Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78, 72, 244 Wis. 2d 613, T 72, 628
N.W.2d 376, 72 (Crooks, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473, 247 N.W.2d at
101-02).
158. Id. 9 73, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 9 73, 628 N.W.2d 376, 1 73.
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considered unnecessary or unreasonable in light of the purpose of the
zoning law."'5 9 He refused to join Justice Sykes's lead opinion because
he rejected her revision of the standard of unnecessary hardship and saw
no reason to overturn Kenosha County."
But it becomes clear as one reads further into the opinion that
Justice Crooks fell into exactly the confusion that the court in Snyder
warns against. Having accepted that the standard of hardship is no
reasonable use, Justice Crooks nonetheless, quite bizarrely and without
explaining how it might actually be done, insisted that whether there is
no reasonable use must be determined in light of the policy of the
regulation. "However," he wrote, "the 'no reasonable use' language of
Kenosha County should have been applied by the Board only after
considering the purpose of the zoning ordinance, and the nature of the
specific restriction at issue."'' He seems to believe that the standard of
no reasonable use can vary with the goals of the regulation. It is
patently clear, as the court recognized in Snyder and Kenosha County,
that the necessity of the hardship varies with the goals of the regulation
and the extent of the variance-indeed it must. But "no reasonable
use" is simply no reasonable use. It is one thing, as Justice Sykes
insisted in her lead opinion, for the standard of hardship to be less than
that for use and to be measured against the owner's desires. It is quite
another thing to insist that the standard for area variances, as for use
variances, is no reasonable use, but that the standard of "no use" can
somehow vary from circumstance to circumstance. The language alone
precludes variation.
The absolute nature of the concept, and at least one important
justification, are well illustrated in Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.'62 Lucas was an enormous leap in the
sophistication of the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia, among other things, eliminated the vague
balancing test from Penn Central, converting the public policy
counterweight into a bright line nuisance exception. More importantly
for the present discussion, he also introduced into the doctrine a second,
159. Id. 72, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 72, 628 N.W.2d 376, 72 (quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at
473, 247 N.W.2d at 101-02); see supra text accompanying note 69.
160. Id. 71-72, 244 Wis. 2d 613, J 71-72, 628 N.W.2d 376, $1 71-72 ("I write
separately because I see no reason to overrule [Kenosha County] .... It is with the lead
opinion's interpretation of the 'unnecessary hardship' standard that I part company .. .
161. Id. 76, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 76,628 N.W.2d 376, T 76.
162. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
163. Id. at 1031; see also supra note 141.
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bright line per se rule: a regulation that so restricts the use of a parcel of
land that it "deprives the owner of all economically feasible use" is a
taking per se.' 6' The per se rule of Lucas is identical to the traditional
hardship threshold condition of variances. That it meant exactly what it
said is illustrated by Justice Scalia's careful reply to Justice Stevens's
complaint that the rule was too severe and arbitrary in that it
compensated an owner 100% of the value of the owner's property when
the entire value had been destroyed but gave an owner no remedy when
the regulation destroyed only 95% of the value. Justice Scalia
explained that the rule did not preclude compensation in the latter
case.' 66 In such cases, the owner might not have the benefit of the per se
rule, but might still be entitled to some compensation under the
weighing test of Penn Central. Justice Scalia did not say that the no
economic use test allowed for variation depending on the public interest
at stake. Indeed, such a move would have been completely antithetical
to the conversion of the public's interest from a counterweight in a
balance to a bright line nuisance exception.
6
1
Justice Crooks made a second error that also suggests a very loose
apprehension of the concept of a hardship in the context of the variance
provision. Although the immediate desire of the owners in Outagamie
County was to add a porch to their home, the obstacle to constructing
the porch was not any regulation bearing on the porch itself. The
obstacle to the porch was the fact that the basement to the house
violated floodplain regulations that prohibited the basement altogether.
The owners were therefore seeking a variance from the floodplain
regulations concerning the basement. Because the floodplain
regulations were in effect when the owners built their home, the
nonconforming basement would ordinarily have been considered a self-
created hardship." But the owners in Outagamie County argued that
the basement was not a self-created hardship because when they applied
for the building permit to construct their home with the nonconforming
164. Id. at 1015, 1016 & n.7.
165. Id. at 1019 & n.8.
166. Id.
167. A few years ago, I had the opportunity to talk with Justice Scalia about this aspect
of his decision in Lucas. I suggested to him that his reply to Justice Stevens's criticism was
oddly dissonant with the rest of Lucas which, by eliminating the soft balancing from Penn
Central and introducing a bright line per se rule, otherwise sought to bring clarity to the rule
and eliminate the soft and unpredictable balancing of Penn Central. His response, refreshing
in its candor, was, "You're assuming I wrote footnote eight."
168. See, e.g, Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468,
476, 247 N.W.2d 98, 103 (1976).
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basement, the town's building department not only failed to inform
them of the floodplain regulation but granted them the permit.' 69 Justice
Crooks agreed with that argument and held that the actions of the
town's building department estopped the county ZBA from denying the
variance."'
The problem with this argument begins with conceiving of the
basement as a hardship, whether or not self-created. The only kind of
hardship that is significant for the sake of a variance is the inability to
develop because of special conditions of the land. As the court made
clear in Snyder,
Practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship do not
include conditions personal to the owner of the land, but
rather to the conditions especially affecting the lot in
question. "[I]t is not the uniqueness of the plight of the
owner, but uniqueness of the land causing the plight,
which is the criterion.'
171
In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had never applied the
doctrine of estoppel against a municipality because of the actions of a
zoning administrator. A similar issue arose in Snyder, and the court
unequivocally refused to adopt the doctrine in that circumstance: "[T]he
mere statements or assurances of the building inspector cannot confer
such a right. The [owner] is charged with knowledge of the zoning
ordinance and thus may not successfully contend that the existence of
the porch, constructed without first obtaining a variance, is not a self-
created hardship."'' 2
Justice Crooks believed that the unavailability of estoppel should
only apply, however, in cases where a neighbor seeks to enforce the
provisions of a regulation. Estoppel should apply, according to Justice
Crooks, when the government itself is seeking to enforce a regulation
over its own prior error.Y1
3
As intuitively appealing as it might be to relieve a property owner of
169. See State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 17, 244 Wis. 2d
613, 17, 628 N.W.2d 376, J 17.
170. Id. 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 78, 628 N.W.2d 376, '1 78 (Crooks, J., concurring).
171. Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 479, 247 N.W.2d at 104 (quoting 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.167, at 543-45 (3d ed. 1965)).
172. Id. at 477, 247 N.W.2d at 103 (citation omitted).




burdens caused at least in part by the negligence of a zoning
administrator, the variance would still not appear to be the appropriate
relief. As mentioned earlier, both the requirement that the property be
unique and that the owner suffer a hardship because of the unique
conditions preclude the remedy of a variance."' The statutory
conditions for the variance are not elastic enough to accommodate the
doctrine of estoppel. The more appropriate remedy would be a
declaratory judgment by a court that, in the appropriate circumstance,
the municipal government is estopped from enforcing its regulations. If
the municipal government is estopped from enforcing its regulations,
then the nonconformity is no longer a nonconformity simply by virtue of
the estoppel and no variance is required. Accommodating estoppel
within the variance provision adds confusion to the meaning of hardship
and compromises the intended functions of the variance remedy. It also
suggests a willingness to twist doctrine whenever expedient to reach a
desired outcome.
B. Ziervogel and Waushara County
After Outagamie County, Ziervogel might seem to be something of
an anticlimax, and indeed in many ways it is. Justice Sykes came to the
same conclusions concerning area variances and offered the same
arguments that she introduced in Outagamie County. Kenosha County,
she still claimed, wrongly departed from the standard set in Snyder.'75
More fundamentally, the definition of "unnecessary hardship" must be
expansive enough to provide local ZBAs with discretion, so they can do
justice in circumstances where the public policy does not justify the
frustration of an owner's desire to improve her property. 76  Thus,
"unnecessary hardship" in the case of area variances requires a ZBA to
balance the public interest in zoning compliance "against the private
interests of property owners in individual cases. ' '177 The methodological
and conceptual errors in this line of argument were already discussed in
the preceding section.
What is most interesting about Ziervogel, then, is not the opinion but
174. See supra Part III.
175. State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, $$ 3-
4, 269 Wis. 2d 549, T$ 3-4, 676 N.W.2d 401, $[ 3-4.
176. Id. 4-5, 269 Wis. 2d 549, % 4-5,676 N.W.2d 401, $ 4-5.
177. Id. $ 17, 269 Wis. 2d 549, $ 17, 676 N.W.2d 401, 9 17. ("Variance procedure in
zoning law serves several essential purposes: ... to provide a procedure by which the public
interest in zoning compliance can be balanced against the private interests of property owners
in individual cases .... ).
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the votes. Only one new member joined the court after Outagamie
County and before Ziervogel: Justice William Bablitch left the court to
be replaced by Justice Patience Roggensack. Justices Abrahamson and
Bradley, who dissented in Outagamie County, did not participate in the
decision. Otherwise, all of the justices joined in Justice Sykes's opinion
for the court, including Justices Crooks and Wilcox, who refused to join
Justice Sykes in Outagamie County. It is those two born-again votes
that made Justice Sykes's plurality opinion in Outagamie County the
court's opinion in Ziervogel.
Equally intriguing is Justice Crooks's opinion for the same majority
two months later in Waushara County.178 We have already seen that in
his concurring opinion in Outagamie County, Justice Crooks embraced a
categorical error that allowed the relatively bright line concept of no
reasonable use to vary with the goals of the regulation. In Waushara
County, he found that the lower courts had not applied the no
reasonable use test as flexibly as he had hoped. "When we consider the
emphasis on purpose that we find in Kenosha County," he wrote, "it
appears that the no reasonable use standard has been applied, since that
case, in a very restrictive manner." '179 But as was discussed earlier, how
else does one apply language that is nigh on absolute?"8
His disappointment with the way in which the condition has been
administered leads him to declare it no longer the law. In its place, the
court will return to the definition of hardship that he believed was given
in Snyder: "in evaluating whether to grant an area variance to a zoning
178. See State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679
N.W.2d 514. It is also intriguing that there were two opinions in these cases. Both were
argued together on the same day, both involved the exact same issue-the definition of
hardship for area variances, both came to roughly the same conclusion, and the same
majorities joined both of the court's opinions. Curiously, too, though the court's opinion in
Waushara County came out two months after the court's opinion in Ziervogel, Justice
Crooks's opinion in Waushara County does not discuss or even cite to the opinion in
Ziervogel until near the very end, in a footnote that says only, "We note that this opinion
should be read together with our decision in State ex rel. Richard W. Ziervogel v. Washington
County Bd. of Adjustment, which was released earlier this term of the court." Id. 34 n.20,
271 Wis. 2d 547, T 34 n.20, 679 N.W.2d 514, 34 n.20 (citation omitted). Speculation would
be idle, especially where the known facts, the opinions in these cases, and their development,
themselves pose ample problems.
179. Id. 32, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 32, 679 N.W.2d 514, 91 32 (citing Ziervogel, 2003 WI App
82, 263 Wis. 2d 321, 661 N.W.2d 884; Voss v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-
1307, 2003 WL 1889443 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2003); State v. Waushara County Bd. of
Adjustment, No. 02-2400 (Wis. Ct. App. May 7, 2003)).
180. The very fact that at least two panels of the court of appeals applied the no




ordinance, a board of adjustment should focus on the purpose of the
zoning law at issue in determining whether an unnecessary hardship
exists for the property owner seeking such variance. 18 ' Thus, jettisoning
the more objective standard of no reasonable use, hardship becomes, as
it does with Justice Sykes, relative to the desires of the owner. In Justice
Sykes's version of the test, the ZBA is supposed to assign weights to the
desire of the owner and the goals of the regulation and balance the
two.' 82  Justice Crooks never used the term balance and did not
elaborate beyond what has already been discussed. The continued
ambiguity in his opinion is the result of the combination of, on the one
hand, failing to disentangle the two dimensions of "unnecessary
hardship," i.e., (i) hardship and (ii) whether it is nonetheless necessary
to preserve the goals of the regulation, and, on the other hand, failing to
explain consequently whether policy bears on necessity or hardship. It
is possible that his test is modest: the variance must be denied,
regardless of the degree of frustration of the owner's desires, if the
variance, were it granted, compromises the goals of the regulation. Or
perhaps Justice Crooks is willing to allow a variance to compromise the
policy of the regulation to a greater degree when the hardship is more
significant. Justice Crooks's formulation of the rule leaves the idea
unclear.
It would appear, in any event, that Justice Crooks should have
agreed with Justice Sykes that Kenosha County must be overruled,
particularly because he, along with the rest of the majority, joined
Justice Sykes's opinion in Ziervogel that explicitly overruled Kenosha
County. But, quite bizarrely, he once again rejected that conclusion:
"We find no need to accept the [owners'] invitation to overrule Kenosha
County. Rather, the term 'no reasonable use,' as set forth in Kenosha
County, is no longer applicable when consideration is being given to
whether to grant an area variance.' ' 13 Reading these opinions, one has
the discomfiting feeling that words do not bind as expected and rules no
longer guide. A post-modernist with a deconstructive bent might have a
field day with these opinions, though I suspect the legal realist would be
content to nod knowingly.
181. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 91 2,271 Wis. 2d 547, 9 2, 679 N.W.2d 514, 2.
182. See State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 38, 244 Wis. 2d
613, 38, 628 N.W.2d 376, 38.
183. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, $1 32, 271 Wis. 2d 547, T 32, 679
N.W.2d 514, 91 32.
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C. The Scope of Ziervogel and Waushara County: Consideration of
Special Conditions
I suggested at the outset that the effect of Ziervogel and Waushara
County might be modest if the court still limited the availability of
variances to situations in which there is, in the words of the statute,
some "special condition" of the property which, given the regulation,
creates the hardship. We have seen that this condition was intended to
distinguish cases that were appropriate for administration by a local
quasi-judicial board from cases that were more appropriately resolved
by the elected, policy-making legislative body of the municipality with
the advice of its professional planning commission. As the court
observed in Arndorfer: "The 'uniqueness' element is necessary to
prevent the purposes of the zoning regulations from being undermined
by the granting of piecemeal exceptions to those regulations ...
[W]here the hardship imposed on the applicant's land is shared by
nearby land, relief should be addressed through legislative, rather than
administrative, means."'84
In both Ziervogel and Waushara County, the court mentions the
uniqueness requirement a number of times in passing, suggesting that it
still provides a discrete and independent limit that continues to
circumscribe the availability of variances."' However, there are also a
great many reasons to believe that the uniqueness limitation has been
subordinated to the overriding goal of granting the ZBAs the discretion
to do justice in individual cases.
In the first instance, there is no acknowledgement in either Justice
Sykes's or Justice Crooks's opinions in Outagamie County, or in their
opinions in Ziervogel or Waushara County, of the role of the legislature
in providing relief in any cases of hardship caused by a land use
regulation. Furthermore, if the court is serious about assuring that the
ZBAs have the authority to do justice in individual cases, it would
appear that the uniqueness requirement, as much as, if not more than,
the hardship requirement, restricts that discretion to a very small
number of cases. In Ziervogel, for instance, Justice Sykes complained
that "[a]pplication of the 'no reasonable use' standard to area variances
184. Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 255-56, 469 N.W.2d
831, 834 (1991) (citing Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d
468, 476-79, 247 N.W.2d 98, 103-04 (1976)).
185. See, e.g., Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, 1 6 n.8, 271 Wis. 2d 547,




overwhelms all other considerations in the analysis, rendering irrelevant
any inquiry into the uniqueness of the property, the purpose of the
ordinance, and the effect of a variance on the public interest.' ' 186 The
same is equally true of the uniqueness requirement. Perhaps an implicit
recognition of that fact, and explicitly motivated by the desire to ensure
that the ZBAs have ample discretion, Justice Sykes gave the uniqueness
requirement a spin such that it no longer acts as a limitation on the
variance, but rather as a condition that favors the grant of the variance.
She wrote, "For the statutory discretionary authority to be meaningful,
boards of adjustment must have the opportunity to distinguish between
hardships that are unnecessary in light of unique conditions of the
property and the purpose of the ordinance, and hardships that do not
warrant relief .... ,187
The most telling evidence that the court no longer regards the
uniqueness requirement as a significant condition is its own disregard of
the requirement in its analysis of the merits of the variance applications
in these various cases. In Outagamie County, for instance, the owners'
hardship had nothing to do with any features of the property that
prevented them from building in compliance with the regulations, much
less features of the property not shared by their neighbors; the hardship
they claimed came about because they built a basement in an area
where basements were not allowed."8  Justice Sykes deemed the
circumstances to be unique because, presumably, only these owners
built a basement based on an erroneously granted permit from the town
building department. She held, "[T]he hardship is unique to the
property and not 'self-created' to the extent that the [owners] built their
home (with the nonconforming basement floor) pursuant to and in
reliance upon a building permit duly issued by the Town of Bovina."'89
In Ziervogel, in their brief before the court, the owners describe
conditions that indicate that their nonconforming home, squeezed
between the lakeshore and a road, is located on the only buildable space
on their lot." Likely because those same conditions apply to all of the
properties adjacent to the owners' property, the owners do not mention
the uniqueness requirement and neither Justice Sykes nor Justice
186. Ziervogel, 2004 WI 23, $ 28, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 28, 676 N.W.2d 401, 28.
187. Id. % 29, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 29, 676 N.W.2d 401, 29.
188. See generally State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244
Wis. 2d 613,628 N.W.2d 376.
189. Id. $ 53,244 Wis. 2d 613, 53,628 N.W.2d 376, 1 53.
190. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners at 5-6, Ziervogel v. Washington County
Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-1618 (Wis. July 10, 2003).
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Crooks in their respective opinions considers whether there is anything
unique about the owners' parcel.
This is in sharp contrast to all of the court's opinions in the cases
immediately preceding Outagamie County, beginning with Snyder. In
Snyder, where the court supported the denial of a variance and instead
required an owner to demolish a nonconforming porch, the court
prominently addressed the uniqueness requirement and held that "the
offset requirement placed upon appellant's lot is not unique or peculiar
to his property, for it applies equally to all lots of similar size. Because
the restriction does not especially affect appellant's lot, it may not
constitute hardship or difficulties which justify a variance.'' 9
In Arndorfer, the homeowners had installed a holding tank in an
area where holding tanks were prohibited.' 9' They sought a variance
after the fact. 93 The court held that "[t]he record provides no basis for
concluding that the soil problems that have caused the Arndorfers'
hardship are unique to their land. Because the Arndorfers have not met
their burden of establishing uniqueness, this court is not in a position to
order the Board to grant their variance. ' 194
Finally, in Kenosha County, the last case correctly decided by the
court, Justice Geske, writing for the court, after first acknowledging the
important role of the legislature in these cases, held with regard to the
plaintiff's nonconforming porch that
[t]he Board itself noted that [the owner's] complaint
about loss of shoreline due to erosion was likely a
condition shared by other Hooker Lake property owners.
In any event, no evidence was offered to demonstrate
that the erosion, even in combination with the slope,
formed a unique condition, one which prevents [the
owner] from enjoying a reasonable use of her property.9
If, as this contrast suggests, the court has subordinated uniqueness,
just as it has hardship, to no more than a factor in a balancing of private
191. Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 477, 247
N.W.2d 98, 103 (1976).
192. Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 250, 469 N.W.2d
831, 832 (1991).
193. Id. at 250-51, 469 N.W.2d at 832.
194. Id. at 258, 469 N.W.2d at 835.




interests and public policy, then it has truly radically reinterpreted the
statutory provision for variances in Wisconsin and thrown its support
behind the rogue practices of the ZBAs themselves.
V. VARIANCES AND PRE-EXISTING, NONCONFORMING USES
Variances and nonconforming structures are obviously intimately
connected. The function of a variance is to permit a structure (or a use)
that would otherwise not be permitted under zoning or other land use
ordinances and would therefore otherwise be nonconforming. The
effect of granting the variance is to relieve the property of the force of
the regulation so that the structure permitted by the variance is a
conforming structure. The variance effectively alters the regulations
applicable to the lot.
The court's decision in Waushara County raises a unique issue,
however, and suggests an additional wrinkle to the variance provision
that cannot be squared with a sound theory of variances. Waushara
County suggests that an owner might be entitled to a variance from the
nonconforming use provisions of the state statute independently of the
underlying regulations that make a structure nonconforming.'9 6 The
owners in Waushara County owned a home on Silver Lake in Waushara
County."9  Their lot was 120 feet deep but subject to overlapping
setbacks, one of 110 feet from the road at the rear of the lot and a
second from the lakeshore of 35 feet, so there was no room left on the
lot for the construction of any improvements.'9 As the court observed,
their home was not in danger of being destroyed because it was already
in existence when the setbacks went into effect.'" It was, in Wisconsin
zoning parlance, a legal nonconforming use.
Legal nonconforming uses in Wisconsin, as in every other state, are
nonetheless subject to some restrictions. The most important restriction
in this instance is the 50% reinvestment rule. Under Wisconsin law at
the time Waushara County was decided, the owners of a nonconforming
structure could not invest in their structure more than 50% of the
assessed value of the structure. 2m0 For example, the county ordinance in
196. See State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679
N.W.2d 514.
197. Id. 9 3,271 Wis. 2d 547, $ 3, 679 N.W.2d 514, 3.
198. Id. $$ 3-4, 271 Wis. 2d 547, $ 3-4, 679 N.W.2d 514, 3-4.
199. Id. 9 4, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 4, 679 N.W.2d 514, $ 4.
200. For counties, the rule is codified at Wisconsin Statutes section 59.69(10). The
parallel provision for cities, villages and qualifying towns is at Wisconsin Statutes section
62.23(7)(h). The county rule provides in pertinent part:
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Waushara County provided that "[n]o nonconforming structure or use
during its total lifetime shall be enlarged or expanded in excess of 50%
of its equalized assessed value over the life of the structure or project
unless permanently changed to conform with the regulations of this
ordinance."2 1  Because of the reinvestment rule, the owners in
Waushara County were denied a building permit to expand their
nonconforming home and add an extension to an outside porch."
Though there is no case law on point, it would appear safe to assume
that the inability of the owners to develop their property because of the
overlapping setbacks would satisfy even the strictest hardship standard
even though the provisions for nonconformities did not require them
immediately to raze their home.03 Nonetheless, under a strict reading of
the variance rules, the owners would not have been eligible for a
variance because, very likely, every home on either side of the subject
An ordinance enacted under this section may not prohibit the continuance
of the lawful use of any building, premises, structure, or fixture for any
trade or industry for which such building, premises, structure, or fixture is
used at the time that the ordinance[] take[s] effect, but the alteration of,
or addition to, or repair in excess of 50 percent of its assessed value of any
existing building, premises, structure, or fixture for the purpose of
carrying on any prohibited trade or new industry within the district where
such buildings, premises, structures, or fixtures are located, may be
prohibited.
WIS. STAT § 59.69(10) (2005-2006). The rule is a masterpiece of confusion. Most
problematic, the rule does not distinguish between nonconforming structures and
nonconforming uses. It appears by its terms to be concerned only with nonconforming uses,
and then only trades and industries, yet the remedy focuses narrowly on reinvestment in the
building. Fortunately, many municipalities, like Waushara County, in their ordinances,
distinguish between nonconforming uses and structures and create appropriate remedies for
each.
201. Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.10(2)(b) (quoted in Waushara County,
2004 WI 56, 5 n.6, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 5 n.6, 679 N.W.2d 514, 5 n.6). The applicable section
has been recodified. See WAUSHARA COUNTY, WIS., ZONING ORDINANCE § 58-235(b)(2)
(2007). The 50% rule, like the variance, is another instance of a land use regulation that is
rarely enforced. In numerous personal conversations with municipal lawyers, I was told that
municipalities have not set up the record keeping systems that would enable them to keep
track of accumulating investments. The only time that the rule is enforced, if then, is when an
owner seeks a permit for large scale construction, as in Waushara County.
202. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, T 5,271 Wis. 2d 547, 5,679 N.W.2d 514, 1 5.
203. This was the theory of then Judge Roggensack, who dissented from the decision of
the court of appeals. Her own opinion, that the variance should have been upheld, ignored
the plain failure of the homeowners to demonstrate uniqueness. After the court of appeals
decision in Waushara County, Justice Roggensack was appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. Though she joined the majority in Ziervogel, she did not participate in the supreme
court's review of Waushara County.
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home for some distance was subject to the same disabling regulations.
Consequently, the owners' home was not subject to "special conditions"
and would therefore not satisfy the uniqueness requirement. This would
have been the sort of situation in which remedies by the ZBA for each
of the homes along that stretch of the lake necessarily would have been
piecemeal. The appropriate remedy was before the county board for
relief from the setbacks.
Instead of seeking relief from the overlapping setbacks from the
county board, however, the owners sought a variance from the ZBA
from the 50% reinvestment rule. Typical of ZBAs, the Waushara
County ZBA granted the variance because, without being overly
concerned about the legal standards, in its opinion, "enforcing the exact
terms of the zoning ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship for
the [owners]."2"4 It also found that the proposed expansion would not
bring the house any closer to the lake."' The circuit court and the court
of appeals, however, purporting to follow Kenosha County, held that the
existence of a current house precluded a finding of hardship and
overturned the grant of the variance.°6
We have already seen that in Waushara County, the court, in its own
oblique way, reaffirmed its decision in Ziervogel to overrule Kenosha
County and the strict no reasonable use standard for area variances.
But the court also pointedly emphasized that the variance application
was from the 50% reinvestment rule. It observed:
While the dissent focuses on the fact that the [owners']
home was near the shore of Silver Lake, we feel that it
bears further emphasis that the [owners] sought a
variance from the 50 percent rule in § 2.10(b), which
relates to nonconforming structures and uses, not from
the shoreland zoning provisions .... 207
The clear implication is that one could grant a variance from the 50%
rule even if an owner might not be eligible for a variance from the
underlying regulation that made the structure nonconforming.
While this may be possible under the open-ended tests of Ziervogel
204. Waushara County, 2004 WI 56, 6, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 6, 679 N.W.2d 514, 1 6.
205. Id. T 6, 271 Wis. 2d 547, T 6, 679 N.W.2d 514, 6.
206. Id. T 8-9, 271 Wis. 2d 547, TT 8-9, 679 N.W.2d 514, 8-9. The circuit court and
the court of appeals did not appear to take into consideration the fact that the setbacks
working together prohibited any development of the owner's parcel.
207. Id. T 5 n.7, 271 Wis. 2d 547, T 5 n.7, 679 N.W.2d 514, J 5 n.7.
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and Waushara County, which give the ZBAs the discretion and charge
simply to balance private interests against public goals, this is not sound
under the traditional understanding of variances that this article
defends. This is a simple function of the fact that the statutory standard
permits a variance only when there is some unique property of the
parcel, which in combination with the land use regulations makes it
impossible to develop the parcel. Setbacks that overlap because of the
small size of a lot are an extreme but not uncommon example. Setbacks
on a parcel that is home to a sizable wetland can eliminate any possible
building site on a parcel and thus create the required hardship. But the
50% rule does not interact with unique features of the land in the same
way as setbacks to constrain an owner's ability to develop the property.
The hardship, the inability to develop the land, if there is a hardship, is
created by the dimension limitations. If an owner is not entitled to a
variance for any of the reasons demanded by the traditional rule-lack
of uniqueness, lack of hardship, dissonance with the goals of the
underlying statute-it is difficult to See how those inhibitions would be
any different if one shifted the focus of the analysis to the 50% rule
instead of the underlying land use restrictions that created the
nonconformity. One will still be led back at every turn to the underlying
dimension restrictions. Even to determine if the variance will affront
the policy goals, one cannot focus on the reinvestment rule alone. The
reinvestment rule simply operates to put off the time that the structure
has to be brought into harmony with the goals of the underlying
dimension requirements. Thus it is the goals of the underlying
limitations that are the pertinent goals.2"
VI. THE VARIANCE PROVISION FOR CITIES
Each of the decisions discussed in this article concerned the
definition of the term "unnecessary hardship" as it appears in the
Wisconsin zoning enabling act for counties.2' Under the traditional
approach defended in this article, the term refers to two of the three
conditions necessary to grant a variance: (i) that the owner can make no
reasonable use of the land (hardship); (ii) that the requested variance
would not compromise the land use regulations that prevent a
208. This would appear to be true even under the more freewheeling approach of
Ziervogel since the 50% rule is not so much a policy goal for the area as relief for the property
owner. The 50% rule is a limit to the grace period provided for a nonconforming structure to
become conforming.
209. WIs. STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) (2005-2006).
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reasonable use (necessity); and (iii) that the hardship is caused by some
condition of the land not shared by other parcels within the contiguous
zone (uniqueness). We have also seen that in Ziervogel, the court
dramatically revised this formulation, at least for variances from
dimension regulations. An owner apparently no longer needs to
demonstrate that his land is unique or that the unique features plus the
regulations prevent development. The owner need only convince the
ZBA that the frustration of the owner's desires are weighty enough to
outbalance the policy goals of the regulation.
The parallel variance provision for cities, villages and qualifying
towns differs in one very important and pertinent respect from the
provision for counties. Where the county statute refers only to
'unnecessary hardship, ''210 the provision for municipalities refers to
either "practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship."2 "' It does not
distinguish anywhere between variances for uses and variances for
structures, much less indicate that these different formulations of the
hardship requirement apply one to uses and the other to structures.
The difference would appear to have no practical significance under
Ziervogel since the court there interpreted the single term "unnecessary
hardship" to mean something different in its application to these two
circumstances. The appearance of the distinct term "practical
difficulties" could easily be interpreted to support the recognition of a
distinct standard of hardship for area variances. In Ziervogel, the court
adopted the different term "unnecessarily burdensome," first used
redundantly in Snyder, to distinguish the hardship standard for area
variances from the no-reasonable-use rule for use variances.1 2 The
difference is hardly significant. Neither term, "practical difficulties" nor
"unnecessarily burdensome," is transparent or more descriptive than the
other; what is important is that there are two distinct terms that suggest
the possibility of different standards for two different situations. The
court could also draw support for this conclusion from other
jurisdictions that have recognized distinct standards of hardship for area
variances when the statute contains these two terms. 3
How the appearance of the second term "practical difficulties" in the
210. Id.
211. WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e)7 (2005-2006).
212. State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, 41,
269 Wis. 2d 549, 41, 676 N.W.2d 401, 41.
213. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 33, § 6.48. No other jurisdiction, however,
has gone as far as Ziervogel in effectively subordinating uniqueness and converting hardship
into a balancing test.
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provision for cities and villages would play out under Snyder is not as
clear. The confounding factor is that in Snyder the court specifically
held that "practical difficulties" meant the exact same thing as
"unnecessary hardship" and that they both meant no reasonable use.
However, as we saw, the court was likely motivated to that conclusion in
an effort to avoid a conflict between a local ordinance that used both
terms and the governing statute for counties that used only the single
term "unnecessary hardship." Where the enabling statute uses both
terms, those concerns are absent, and the court might read the statute as
obliquely suggesting two standards that could be applied to these two
distinct circumstances. As noted above, other courts have followed that
reasoning, though none has gone so far as the court in Ziervogel-
effectively subordinating uniqueness and converting the hardship
determination into a balancing test. Sensitive to the dominate policy-
making role and accompanying procedures of legislative bodies, other
courts more appropriately continue to limit the availability of variances
to circumstances in which the property suffers some feature not shared
by other properties and, even if the hardship is made relative to the
desires of the homeowner, the policy goals are not subject to a balance
and continue to impose a more firm limit on the ability of a ZBA to
grant the variance.
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